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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 19701 (Clean Air Act), passed 
by Congress at the apex of the environmental movement, is un-
doubtedly the seminal piece of legislation in air pollution control. 
Its success or failure has obvious consequences for the quality of the 
air we breathe. Moreover, since the 1970 Act is a model of well-
written environmental legislation, any subsequent failure to achieve 
its explicit goals must necessarily cast doubt on the Nation's whole 
strategy of controlling pollution by means of government regula-
tion.2 
The fate of the Clean Air Act is a subject much discussed but 
little understood. Although it is generally conceded that the Act, to 
date, has failed to achieve its goals,3 even the most critical treat-
ments of the Act's checkered fate have been inadequate. By simply 
attributing the Act's lack of success to either a failure of logic on 
I 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970) (present version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.). The Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) completely revised the 
Act. The Act was transferred and reclassified to 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. However, since this 
article is primarily concerned with the version of the statute in effect from 1970-77, the 
citation to the 1970 edition of U.S.C. will be used. The 1977 Amendments will be referred to 
as the "Amendments" to distinguish the present version from the 1970 version. 
2 Regulation by independent agency is a long-standing method dealing with social prob-
lems in America. See generally M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATION OF BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955). This tradition - the wisdom of which is questioned in this article-was 
continued almost blindly during the peak years of the environmental movement. It is embod-
ied not only in the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970), but in other pollution 
control measures such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1288 et seq. (1976) and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
2601 et seq. (1976), as well. 
I See, e.g., text at notes 44-46, infra. 
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the part of those who designed the program, or a failure of nerve on 
the part of those in government entrusted with carrying out the 
"popular will" embodied in the legislation,4 critics have ignored the 
fundamental question surrounding the Act's future: whether gov-
ernment regulation and planning can bring about as profound a 
change in the economy and social practice as the rapid improve-
ment of air quality, or, indeed, whether clean air can be realized at 
all under American capitalism as it is presently constituted. 
This article presents a negative answer to the preceding question. 
Such a conclusion is reached by first outlining the essential provi-
sions and goals of the Clean Air Act and showing that, despite the 
enactment of the statute in 1970, air quality has not improved sig-
nificantly and is nowhere near the goals established in the Act. The 
legal erosion of the Act is explained in the following section by 
documenting the non-enforcement, concessions and revisions by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the President and the 
state and national legislatures. Next, the article discusses the work-
ings of the American government as it presently exists, and adopts 
the view that the government is not a self-constitutive, neutral body 
which is independent of the social formation that it is intended to 
govern. Instead, the government is subject to many of the internal 
contradictions of which society itself is comprised, and which can 
be observed through an examination of the structure of government 
and the external pressures applied to government. The next section 
examines some of the societal forces outside the control of any single 
agent which form political and economic barriers to the implemen-
tation of the Act, despite the original intentions of the agencies or 
legislatures. The article concludes that, although anti-pollution ef-
forts have had some effect, government in its present form lacks the 
power necessary to overcome the inherent barriers which are imped-
ing the attainment of clean air.5 . 
• E.g., Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: The First 
Six Years, 6 EcoWGY L.Q. 161 (1976). Kramer summarizes his own article as follows: 
This Article examines a fundamental defect in the implementation of the Clean Air Act: 
namely, that it has taken longer to establish the meaning of its programs than the time 
allotted for their accomplishment. 
The responsibility for this defect is shared by Congress, EPA, the state and the federal 
courts. 
[d. at 163. 
• Since the focus of this article is a case study of the Clean Air Act as legal policy, rather 
than an examination of the technical questions surrounding air quality and its health effects 
or the general question of state planning, most attention centers on the analysis of the legal 
erosion of the Act. Other issues are dealt with less extensively since, in each such instance, 
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II. THE CLEAN AIR Acr AND AIR QUALITY: GOALS AND FAILURES 
Federal air pollution control legislation in the United States is 
relatively new.8 In 1955, Congress enacted the first Air Pollution 
Control Act which focused entirely on providing research and tech-
nical assistance for air pollution control. 7 Subsequent legislation 
included the 1963 Clean Air Act, 8 a weak initial effort to regulate 
air pollution, the 1965 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control ActS and 
the Air Quality Act of 1967.10 However, popular sentiment against 
air pollution and frustration with the near complete futility of these 
regulatory efforts II culminated in a demand for the total revision of 
<, prior legislation. As a result, the 1970 Act, passed as amendments 
to the 1963 Clean Air Act, was so far-reaching that it effectively 
established a new beginning in air pollution control. 
The purpose of the 1970 Act is "to protect and enhance the quality 
of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and 
welfare and the productive capacity of its population. . . . "12 The 
Act has two major goals: the protection of public health and the 
broader goal of enhancement of public welfare. To these ends, Con-
gress directed that national ambient air quality standards be estab-
the full scope of theory and presentation of all the evidence needed to defend the article's 
position lie outside the feasible range of a single paper. 
A reason for the detailed treatment of the legal erosion of the Act is that no one has provided 
an up-to-date and comprehensive review of such erosion, although the evidence is easily 
available. Furthermore, issues of growth control and planning, which are currently in the 
forefront of clean air controversy and which reveal most clearly the limits of single-purpose 
regulation, are highlighted in the discussion of the legal erosion of the Act. 
• For a historical review, see J.C. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, THE Pouncs OF POLLUTION (1975); 
J. ESPOSITO, VANISHING AIR (1970); Comment, A History of Federal Air Pollution Control, 30 
OHIO S. L.J. 516 (1969). 
7 The Act of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955). 
• Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963). 
• Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965). 
10 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). The 1967 Air Quality Act was, in fact, composed 
of extensive amendments to the 1965 Act. 
" See J. ESPOSITO, .mpra note 6. The regulatory failure preceding the enactment of the 
1970 Clean Air Act is significant to the analysis of the regulatory failure following the Act. 
Under a conventional view, good law will produce the desired results. See, e.g., T. LOWI, THE 
END OF LIBERALISM (1969). Hence the struggle up to 1970 was to secure a good, strong law, 
which should then succeed. This article, on the other hand, adopts the position that political-
economic structural forces underlie regulatory failure and, therefore, the more legislation 
attempts to defy these forces, the more resistance will be encountered. Thus an apparently 
strong law will frequently achieve little more than a weak one. 
,% 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(I)(1970). This language was taken from the Clean Air Act of 1963, 
Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 393 (1963) which stated that the purpose of the 1963 Act 
was "to protect the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
the productive capacity of its population. . . . " 
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lished for certain designated "criteria pollutants."13 These pollu-
tants were viewed as the basic measure of air quality, providing both 
targets for improvements and indices of the success of pollution 
control efforts. Primary standards for the criteria pollutants were to 
be set at levels which would protect public health,14 while more 
stringent secondary standards served the more ambitious goal of 
promoting public welfare. 15 Ambient air quality was expected to 
meet primary standards by May 31,197518 (with allowance for possi-
ble delay to 1977),17 while secondary standards were to be met 
within a reasonable time thereafter .18 
The Act created a cooperative state-federal framework as the 
means for implementation. Ie EPA was given direct authority to es- ' 
tablish national ambient air quality standards,20 limits on a special 
category of "hazardous air pollutants,"21 standards for emissions 
from new stationary sources22 and standards for new motor vehicles 
which would achieve a ninety percent reduction in carbon monoxide 
and hydrocarbons by 1975 and a ninety percent reduction in nitro-
gen oxides emissions by 1976.23 States were given primary responsi-
bility for achieving and maintaining ambient air quality stan-
dards.24 They were to adopt their own strategies to meet this respon-
sibility and to submit an implementation plan (State Plan)25 to be 
reviewed by EPA.28 However, if EPA determined that a State Plan 
were inadequate, it could promulgate regulations setting forth all, 
or part, of an implementation plan for that state.27 
Finally, to complete the statutory framework the Act expressly. 
allowed judicial review of EPA action with respect to the promulga-
13 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970). There are currently six criteria pollutants: particulates, 
sulfur oxides, hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, nitrogen dioxide and photochemical oxidants 
(chiefly ozone). 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.11 (1977). 
I< 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1)(1970). 
Ii [d. § 1857c-4(b)(2). 
It The State Implementation Plans were due on January 31, 1972, four months were al-
lowed for EPA review and three years for compliance. See W. RoDGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
237 (1977). 
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)(1970). 
II See id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
10 [d. § 1857c-5. 
20 [d. §§ 1857c-3(a), 1857c-4. 
21 [d. § 1857c-7. 
22 [d. § 1857c-6. 
23 [d. § 1857f-1(b)(1). 
U [d. § 1857c-2(a). 
21 [d.; see also id. § 1857c-5(a)(1). 
:It [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2). 
27 [d. § 1857c-5(c). 
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tion of standards or the approval or promulgation of any implemen-
tation plans,28 and gave private citizens a right of action in federal 
courts against violators of emission standards or to compel EPA to 
perform its statutory duties.28 
In order to achieve national ambient air quality standards, emis-
sions limitations were to be imposed on two main classes of pollu-
ters: stationary sources (chiefly industrial plants)30 and mobile 
sources (chiefly automobiles).31 Existing sources were to be brought 
into compliance almost entirely by efforts at the state level. State 
Plans were to include "emissions limitations, schedules, and time-
tables for compliance" for existing stationary sources, as well as 
"such other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and 
maintenance of such primary or secondary standards, including, 
but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls."32 EPA was 
given a direct hand in controlling new sources of pollution through 
its powers over motor vehicle emissions33 and new source perform-
ance standards,34 but the states were also to play an important role. 35 
The State Plans had to include a procedure for "preconstruction 
review" of new sources which might prevent the attainment or 
maintenance of ambient air standards38 and to which EPA perform-
ance standards would apply.37 Furthermore, actual implementation 
of performance standards could be (and has been) delegated to the 
states.38 
The Clean Air Act is a nearly unequivocal mandate for the attain-
ment and maintenance of air quality standards to protect public 
J health and welfare. It is an unusually powerful and uncompromising 
piece of legislation because it sets relatively specific goals,3D estab-
lishes a definite and short-term timetable for implementation40 and 
.. [d. § 1857h-5. 
" [d. § 1857h-2. 
30 E.g., id. § 1857c-6. 
31 [d. § 1857f-1. 
32 [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B). 
33 See id. § 1857c-6 . 
.. [d. § 1857f-1. 
,. See Ferguson, Direct Federal Controls: New Source Performance Standards and Hazard-
ous Emissions, 4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 645, 648-49 (1975). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(4)(1970). 
37 [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D). 
38 [d. § 1857-6(c)(1). A state may undertake implementation and enforcement of standards 
for new stationary sources if it submits a plan to EPA and EPA finds the plan adequate and 
delegates its authority to implement and enforce the standards to the state. [d. 
31 E.g., id. § 1857f-1(b)(1) . 
.. See, e.g., id. § 1857c-5(a). 
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authorizes the use of broad strategies of regulation and planning to 
attain its goals'" Furthermore, the statutory mandate is subject to 
little modification by such provisions as those requiring the balanc-
ing of health benefits against economic costs and technological or 
political feasibility.42 The Act is thus a classic piece of single-
purpose legislation, containing the (probably unanticipated) poten-
tial to generate far-reaching political and economic changes in 
American society. 
Regulation under the Clean Air Act has had a positive effect. Air 
quality indices have shown modest improvement since 1970, and 
comparative figures indicate a reversal of the previously unchecked 
increase in pollutant levels in all but one category.43 However, such 
progress should not be confused with success in protecting the pub-
lic health. The air pollution control program has failed in virtually 
every instance to attain its air quality goals. A recent EPA report 
states that the majority of Americans still are breathing air that is 
harmful to their health.44 As of 1977, only one major metropolitan 
area, Honolulu, did not violate any of EPA's primary standards for 
the six "criteria" pollutants,45 while two of the three largest metro-
politan areas, Los Angeles and Chicago, violated all six.4ft 
Notwithstanding the failure to meet primary standards by 1975, 
or even 1977, the Council on Environmental Quality has taken an 
optimistic view of what the reduction in pollution levels presages:47 
but extrapolation to a pollution-free future is not very meaningful. 
The reductions so far attained are the ones most easily achieved. 
The initial installation of pollution control equipment on cars and 
smoke stacks, a changeover to low-sulfur fuels, the regulation of 
trash-burning and the least drastic industrial process changes have 
been used to accomplish the reduction; however, more complex and 
expensive methods will be necessary in the future. 48 Also, the re-
.. [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) . 
• 2 See Kramer, supra note 4, at 168-70 . 
• 3 Nationally, between 1970 and 1975, levels of sulfur dioxide dropped 27 percent, carbon 
monoxide 20 percent and particulates 12 percent. Nitrogen oxides, however, have been more 
resistant, actually rising 10 percent since 1970. See San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 24, 1978, 
at 1, col. 1 (EPA figures); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY, SIXTH ANNUAL REpORT 
44 (1975); U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 239 (1976). 
However, the trend of improved air quality has been reversing in recent years. See note 50, 
infra for a more detailed analysis of the trend . 
.. Cited in San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 24, 1978, at 1, col. 1. 
•• [d. 
" [d. 
" U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 239 (1976) . 
.. See, e.g., Mills & Wright, Government Policies Toward Automotive Emissions Control, 
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duced levels manifest themselves at a time of seriously retarded 
economic growth, when all economic indices, including pollution, 
are depressed. 49 Moreover, some initial gains may be slipping away: 
sulfur dioxide and particulate pollution have reversed the earlier 
trend and increased since 1975,50 probably because of increased coal-
burning. 
Furthermore, undue attention to achieving primary standards for 
J the six designated criteria pollutants has diverted public attention 
from other health threats. Various air pollutants besides the criteria 
pollutants are of equal, if not greater, danger to human life. These 
include the heavy metals, synthetic organics and other products and 
by-products of industrial processes, from asbestos to micro-
particulates. 51 Environmental legislation has only just begun to ac-
knowledge and deal with pervasive exposure to toxic and carcino-
genic substances in the environment. 52 The idea that a mere handful 
of pollutants could be taken as the crux of the air quality and public 
in ApPROACHES TO CONTROWNG AIR POLLUTION 348-421 (A. Friedlander ed. 1978). The only 
progress toward reducing emissions levels that will come easily in the future will be the 
continuing retirement of pre-catalytic converter automobiles. Industrial and power plant 
dispersal may contribute to a redistribution of pollution from cities to rural areas, but disper-
sal does not reduce net national pollution. Further progress toward clean air will be impeded 
by rising costs (since the least costly changes have already been effected), continued growth 
in industrial output and automobile usage and the impact of a national energy policy which 
encourages the use of coal. 
.. The most serious recession since the 1930's struck the United States economy in 1974-
75. This sharp setback was but the nadir of a longer period of economic difficulties beginning 
about 1965, worsening after 1970 and still continuing to the present despite some economic 
improvement in 1976-78. See U.S. CAPITAUSM IN CRISIS (Union of Radical Political Scientists 
ed. 1978); E. MANDEL, THE SECOND SLUMP (1978); P. SWEEZY & H. MAGDOFF, THE END OF 
PROSPERITY (1977); THE ECONOMIC CRISIS READER (D. Hermelstein ed. 1975). See also Sweezy, 
The Present Stage of the Global Crisis of Capitalism, 29 MONTHLY REv. 1 (1975) on the 
slowness of the recovery. 
50 AcompariRon of EPA statistics for 1975 and 1977 shows that while SO, levels in 1975 
were reduced 27 percent from 1970 levels, 1977 figures indicate that SO, levels were only 17 
percent lower than the 1970 levels. Particulates registered a 12 percent reduction in 1975 
but were only 8 percent lower in 1977 than the 1970 levels. Carbon monoxide levels were the 
same in 1977 as in 1975 (down 20 percent from 1970). Nitrogen dioxide levels were above 
1970 levels for both 1975 and 1977. Ozone pollution showed no decrease between 1970 and 
1977, except in California (although 30 percent more cars were on the road). San Francisco 
Chroncile, Feb. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 5. 
" See generally L. LAVE & E. SESKIN, AIR POLLUTION AND HUMAN HEALTH (1977), see also 
U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 11 (1977); S. EpSTEIN, THE 
POLITICS OF CANCER (1978). 
52 E.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976); 
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976); Federal Environmental Pesti-
cide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified in scattered sections 
of 15, 21 U.S. C). 
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safety problems seems sadly naive in light of the advances in na-
tional awareness since 1970 of the dangers of toxic substances. 
m. EROSION OF THE CLEAN Am Ar:r AS LAw 
The goals of the Clean Air Act, along with the legal tools to imple-.j 
ment these goals, have been seriously eroded in form and in fact 
since the Act's passage in 1970. Due to this erosion of law, air quality 
improvements have not been as dramatic as Congress and public 
supporters of clean air legislation anticipated in 1970. Prospects for 
further substantial improvement of air quality are even less encour-
aging than they were nine years ago. This section examines a process '/ 
of policy adaptation and compromise, reflected in law, which has 
been underway virtually from the outset of the regulatory effort. 
Each of the following subsections deals with a major program-
matic area which has arisen in the process of implementing the 
Clean Air Act. Since some of these areas were not anticipated by 
Congress and thus were not included as programs in the 1970 Act, 
it is not possible to organize a discussion of the Act simply around 
the categories established therein. However, all the following areas 
of law have been defined in practice by case law, administrative 
policy or subsequent legislation. 
Part A discusses the erosion of the basic tools for regulating am-
bient air quality: standards and State Plans. Parts Band C deal 
with the narrower implementation problems of controlling the two 
major categories of emissions: stationary sources (industrial) and 
mobile sources (automotive). The two parts are not, however, 
strictly parallel since Part B deals with bringing existing sources 
into compliance with standards through state efforts under State 
Plans, while Part C deals chiefly with EPA-implemented controls 
on emissions from new motor vehicles. Parts D and E focus on the 
problems involved in a broader type of implementation strategy 
than emissions controls-strategies which involve planning of one 
sort or another, for example, in transportation, land use and in-
dustrial location. All of the planning strategies involve aspects of 
the urbanization process, and all fall under State Plans. Part D 
treats the early planning initiatives, which grew mainly out of ef-
forts to restrict vehicle use. These efforts have largely been aban-
doned, while attention has turned to the problem of accommodating 
industrial growth, the topic discussed in Part E. Part F provides a 
brief chronological summary and analysis of events in the recent 
history of clean air legislation. 
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A. Establishing A Foundation For Air Quality Control: Setting 
Standards and Preparing State Plans 
The Clean Air Act established a basic two-tiered procedure for 
regulating ambient air quality. First, EPA was to set various am-
bient air and emissions standards and then the states were to sub-
mit State Plans outlining procedures for achieving those standards. 
Despite the seeming simplicity of this procedure, numerous obsta-
cles have arisen which have precluded effective regulation of air 
pollution and have led to an erosion of the Act's goals of protecting 
the public health and enhancing the public welfare. 
1. EPA Standards 
a. Criteria Pollutants 
Compared to implementation and enforcement of the remainder 
'. of the Act, the process of setting ambient air standards was carried 
. out with dispatch by EPA in 1971, and suffered little direct chal-
lenge from industry.53 A probable explanation for the lack of addi-
tional industry pressure on EPA regarding specific standards was 
"the existence of opportunities to exert such pressure further down 
the line in implementing and enforcing the standards."54 Another 
probable reason for the dearth of industry challenges was that the 
connection between an ambient air standard and anyone com-
pany's operations is rather tenuous. Consequently, standards for 
J emissions and timetables in the State Plans-regulations which di-
rectly affect industry-have borne the brunt of corporate resist-
ance. 55 
Although the standards set by EPA for criteria pollutants have 
" Kennecot Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972) was the only challenge to 
an ambient air standard in court. Kramer, supra note 4, at 74. The plaintiff challenged EPA's 
secondary standard for sulfur oxides on the ground that EPA had insufficient scientific 
support for the standard. 462 F.2d at 847. Mter the court remanded the standard to EPA for 
a statement explaining the medical basis for the standard, id. at 850, EPA did not reissue 
the standard. Kramer, supra note 4, at 174. 
Secondary standards have not generally fared very well. EPA set secondary standards 
identical with primary standards for four ofthe six criteria pollutants. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.8-50.11 
(1977). EPA relaxed the sulfur dioxide standard in 1973 by withdrawing annual exposure 
limits. 39 Fed. Reg. 25,678 (1973) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 50.5). Concern with achieving 
secondary standards has subsequently faded away in light of the difficulty of reaching even 
primary standards. 
54 Kramer, supra note 4, at 174 . 
.. See English, State Implementation Plans and Air Quality Enforcement, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
595, 601 (1975). 
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withstood subsequent scrutiny reasonably well,56 knowledge about 
the effects of air pollution remains imperfect and value judgments 
of acceptable risk vary according to interests. In the absence of 
conclusive evidence, reason and politics become an inherent part of 
standard setting. 57 
While EPA primary and secondary air standards may be too . 
stringent, there is good reason to believe that they are not strict ' 
enough.5R Increased scientific knowledge and public awareness of 
health hazards due to low-level exposure to pollutants make the 
1971 standards suspect. A House Committee has stated that "there 
is more and more evidence indicating that there are significant 
health effects at or below the National Air Quality Standards."59 
The 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act provide for an inde-
pendent commission to study and report on the validity of all na-
tional ambient air standards every five years, beginning in 1980.80 
While this provision for review and revision of the standards in order 
to incorporate new scientific knowledge appears reasonable, it also 
creates new opportunities for industry to challenge the standards, 
and may result in their unwarranted weakening since conclusive 
medical evidence to support them may not exist. The outcome will 
probably depend on whether business chooses to initiate challenges. 
Such an industry decision is itself at least partially dependent on 
whether the existing enforcement of air standards is successful-the 
mere establishment of stricter standards has no real detrimental 
effect on businesses as long as measures to attain even the weaker 
standards are not enforced. Regardless of the ultimate effect, the 
standards' review process at least provides industry with a new 
forum for resistance and delay which it may exploit if its interests 
are threatened. A similar review board appointed under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act61 recommended relaxing the water pol-
50 See, e.g., NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, PROCEEDINGS OF CONFERENCE ON HEALTH EFFECTS 
OF AIR POLLUTANTS (1973); NAT'L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, AIR QUALITY AND AUTOMOBILE EMISSION 
CONTROL 6 (1974). 
" See generally J.C. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 6, at 175-97; W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPT-
ABLE RISK (1976). Kennecot Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972) demonstrates 
the difficulty of justifying a pollution standard when medical evidence either does not exist 
or is not conclusive. See note 53, supra . 
.. H.R. REP. No. 94-1175, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1976). 
50 [d. 
so Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 106, 91 Stat. 691 (1977) (to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7409). 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1363 (1976). 
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lution control program.R2 Given a current political atmosphere anta-
gonistic to the Clean Air Act83 and the lack of scientific proof of 
pollution effects, the establishment of a review process which pro-
vides the opportunity for interested parties to exert political pres-
sure during the review of the standards must be regarded as an 
erosion of the 1970 law. 
b. Hazardous Substances 
The establishment of standards for hazardous substance emis-
sions under the 1970 Act has been much less successful than stan-
dard setting for criteria pollutants.84 First, EPA could have added 
certain toxic substances to its list of criteria pollutants for ambient 
air quality, but chose not to do SO.85 Under the law EPA could then 
designate emissions standards from industrial facilities for a sepa-
rate category called "hazardous substances," regarded as more dan-
gerous than the criteria pollutants.88 EPA had ninety days to pub-
lish a list of such substancesY The list issued included only three 
names, however: mercury, beryllium and asbestos. 88 Moreover, the 
agency subsequently proposed very weak standards, such as limit-
ing its regulation of asbestos to the elimination of visible emissions 
only, and had to be compelled after the statutory deadline had 
passed to make the standards final. 89 
.. Quarles, National Water Quality: Assessing the Mid-Course Correction, SIERRA CLUB 
BULLETIN (Feb. 14, 1977). 
13 See, e.g., [SAN FRANCISCO] BAY AREA COUNCIL, BAY AREA COUNCIL BULLETIN 2-4 (No. 17, 
Feb. 1979) (excerpts from speeches delivered at conference hosted by the California Council 
for Economic and Environmental Balance held in San Francisco, Cal., Jan. 1979) . 
.. Although hazardous substance regulation does not fall strictly within the basic frame-
work comprised of federal ambient air quality standards and state implementation plans, it 
is discussed here for three reasons: (1) the significance of toxic substances to public health, 
see text at notes 51 & 52, supra; (2) the failure of government to take action with respect to 
toxic substances counterbalances the apparent success in setting criteria pollutant primary 
standards, see text at notes 53-63, supra; and (3) the delegation by EPA of its authority to 
the states to implement hazardous substance emissions standards under their planning and 
permit procedures pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(d)(I)(1970). Thus, in practice, there is 
no difference between ambient air standards enforcement and hazardous substances enforce-
ment . 
.. W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 225. EPA did not include florides, polynuclear organics 
or lead, although inclusion was suggested by the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water 
Pollution. See S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1970) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7(b)(1970)(establishment of standards); see also id. § 1857c-
7(a)(definition of hazardous substances). 
" [d. § 1857c-7(b). 
1M 36 Fed. Reg. 5931 (1971) . 
.. Environmental Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 3 ENVIR. L. REP. 20173 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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Since 1972 only three more toxic substances have been added to 
EPA's list. 70 Efforts to establish a lead standard encountered vigor-
ous resistance from the oil industry and EPA had to be forced to act 
by an environmentalist suit in NRDC v. Train. 71 Similarly, the En-
vironmental Defense Fund forced EPA to adopt a "zero emissions" 
goal for vinyl chloride production, after a weak standard had been 
put forth in 1976;72 A preliminary standard for benzene was finally 
issued in 1977.73 In one area where EPA had actually sought greater 
jurisdiction and improved standards-radioactive emissions-its 
efforts had been unsuccessful until 1977.74 
Congress recognized the need to extend EPA's meagre list of haz-
ardous substances in the 1977 Clean Air Amendments, but its man-
date is not extraordinarily vigorous. For example, with regard to 
radioactive pollutants, cadmium, arsenic and polycyclic organic 
matter emissions, the Amendments direct EPA to conduct a study 
within one year (two years for radioactive pollutants) to determine 
whether such emissions endanger public health75 and, if 
appropriate, to include any such substance in the list of criteria 
pollutants or hazardous pollutants.78 These Congressional initia-
tives are to be applauded, but by returning the responsibility to 
EPA, an agency which has been so reluctant to act in the past, it is 
very likely that the new standards may never be promulgated or 
enforced.77 
7. Rodgers observes that "It is fair to say that the EPA is more than a little reluctant to 
expand the list of criteria pollutants." W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 230. 
71 411 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), afl'd 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976). 
7% Environmental Defense Fund v. Train, No. 76-2045 (D.C. Cir., filed Nov. 19, 1976), 
dismissed after settlement (June 24, 1977). See also 42 Fed. Reg. 28,154 (1977). The vinyl 
chloride standard applies only to vinyl chloride production itself and not to plants fabricating 
polyvinyl chloride plastics - a serious oversight. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 51, at 362. 
73 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977). 
74 In 1974 EPA announced its intention to issue standards for radiation emissions from the 
normal operations of the nuclear fuel cycle. 39 Fed. Reg. 16,906 (1974). But this initiative 
was never carried through. 
71 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 120,91 Stat. 720 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7422). EPA would thereby establish standards for such emissions. 
7' 1d. EPA also has the alternative of including each category of stationary source emitting 
such substance in significant amounts in the list of categories subject to new source perform-
ance standards. 1d. For a discussion of new source performance standards see notes 288-301, 
infra. 
77 Enforcement of hazardous emissions standards by the states and by EPA ran into a 
serious obstacle in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). The Supreme 
Court held that EPA could not impose criminal sanctions for violations of work-practice rules. 
In his dissent, Justice Stevens wrote that the Court's opinion "has effectively made the 
asbestos standard, and any other work-practice rule as well, unenforceable." 1d. at 306. But 
see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 110, 91 Stat. 703 (1977)(to be 
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2. Balancing-An Erosion of the Act 
.j Congress made little provision in the Clean Air Act for the balanc-
ing of interests, either in the process of setting primary standards 
or in the methods for meeting those standards by the statutory 
deadline;7s a balancing approach is significant only in the process 
J of establishing standards for new stationary sources.79 In fact, the 
introduction of a "balancing test" between the Act's goal of protect-
ing the public health and other factors such as cost of compliance, 
economic disruption and technological feasibility of attainment 
would seriously impair the Act's purposes.80 Nearly every action to 
achieve cleaner air creates some economic costs. If each particular 
action must be evaluated by some principle of balancing clean air 
"benefits" against the economic "costs," then such action is vulner-
able to challenges which are easily presented, but difficult to assess 
concretely. 
Nevertheless, only after five years of conflicting judicial rulings 
j did the United States Supreme Court settle the balancing issue by 
upholding the "no balancing" approach regarding EPA's review of 
State Plans in Union Electric Co. v. EPA.81 The effect of this long 
controversy over the balancing issue has been described as follows: 
While some courts have reluctantly accepted the balances set by Con-
gress, others have totally ignored them. Industry groups have attempted 
to reopen the balancing issue not only through lobbying for legislative 
changes, . . . but also through constant pressure on EPA and through 
lengthy and costly litigation. The result of these attacks has been a 
"hack door" softening of some of the goals ofthe [ Act's]. . . programs, 
and a compromise of the overall goal. Perhaps the most unfortunate 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412)(where Congress explicitly mandated that EPA may promulgate 
work-practice rules). 
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-7 (1970), provides for the establishment 
of emissions limitations; Section 113, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970) allows criminal prosecution 
of violators of Section 112 limitations. EPA complained that Adamo violated the applicable 
emissions limitation for asbestos. However, on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court found 
that while EPA had formulated procedures to be followed during demolition of buildings in 
order to minimize asbestos emissions during the demolition process, EPA had not set quanti-
tative levels for asbestos limitations as specified in Section 112 of the Act. Adamo Wrecking 
Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1978). Therefore, Adamo could not be held in 
violation and prosecuted pursuant to Section 113. 
The Adamo case provides just one indication of how difficult it is to enforce even a straight-
forward portion of the law such as Sections 112 and 113. 
1M Kramer, supra note 4, at 170. 
l' [d . 
.. See id. at 169. 
" 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
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result of these tactics has been the serious delay in defining goals and 
strategies for this program, which Congress intended to be rapidly im-
plemented.R2 
While the courts were struggling with the balancing issue Presi-
dent Ford contributed to the "back door" compromise of the Act's 
clean air goals by requiring regulatory agencies to write Inflationary 
Impact Statements for all major legislative and regulatory propos-
als. 83 The requirement indirectly, but effectively, imposes economic 
balancing on all such programs. Finally, in the 1977 Amendments 
to the Act, Congress opened the front door to balancing by including 
a requirement for Economic Impact Assessments by EPA.s4 
Thus, although the Act began as a virtually absolute mandate for 
public health, without consideration for balancing, the balancing 
controversy compromised the practical effects of the Act by 
"softening" its goals and delaying implementation. Even after a 
ruling that Congress did not intend balancing to affect the review 
of State Plans, the President, and then Congress itself, imposed 
balancing considerations on regulatory efforts. 
3. State Plans-Failure and Fragmentation 
State Plans form the "principal component"85 of the process envi-
sioned by Congress for achieving ambient air standards. Although 
the Act removed from the states responsibility for standard setting, 
auto emissions controls, regulation of new sources and some lesser 
tasks, Congress still relied on the states for most of the enforcement ./ 
effort against the thousands of specific pollution sources. Each State 
Plan is required to provide for "implementation, maintenance and 
enforcement" of national primary and secondary air standards 
within each air quality region in the state.81 Because they outline 
concrete means to force compliance with clean air standards, the 
State Plans have been the primary target of attack from industry v 
and other opponents of clean air regulations.87 They have been sub-
ject to endless litigation and an official retreat from the goals of the 
Clean Air Act by the states themselves, EPA, the courts and Con-
'2 Kramer, supra note 4, at 169 (cites omitted). 
M2 Exec. Order No. 11821, 3 C.F.R. § 926 (1971-75 Compilation) . 
•• Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95·95, § 307, 91 Stat. 778 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7617) . 
.. S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c·5(a)(I)(1970) . 
• 7 See English, supra note 55. 
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gress. The process of implementation at the state level, therefore, 
has not gone according to plan.88 
The Clean Air Act required that the states submit their State 
Plans within nine months after the issuance of ambient air stan-
dards and that EPA review the Plans within four months; if the 
agency did not find a State Plan adequate, it then could issue its 
own plan in place of the state's.89 The states were to write the Plans 
in order to produce compliance with primary standards within three 
years, and in no event later than the overall target date of 1975.90 
EPA could grant a two-year extension of this deadline, to 1977, if 
the state so requested. 91 Despite these Congressional timetables, 
however, the goal of meeting the primary standards was not met by 
J 1975, and has not been met since.92 This failure to achieve compli-
ance with the primary standards within the statutory time frame 
resulted both from the government's failure to obtain satisfactory 
State Plans, and from the failure of the states successfully to enforce 
those Plans ultimately submitted.9s 
By 1975, as the deadlines for submitting State Plans continued 
to retreat in the face of opposition and failure to attain air quality 
standards, EPA had granted two-year delays to twenty-eight states; 
by the end of 1976, a majority of states had not even submitted full 
State Plans and no state had complete approval of its Plan.94 By 
1977, with neither all the State Plans approved nor primary stan-
dards achieved in most of the country, EPA and Congress were 
forced to make some kind of accommodation with the unpleasant 
reality that the Clean Air Act was not being enforced. They re-
sponded with the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, which, in tough 
language that belied its actual result, legitimized the delays by 
requiring all states with Air Quality Control Regions in violation of 
an ambient air standard to submit revised implementation plans by 
.. The difficulties encountered in fashioning and implementing State Plans is not surpris-
ing when one considers that implementation of the Act in general has not been a smooth 
process. "The Clean Air Act is a potpourri of postponements, revisions, extensions and sus-
pensions." W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 238 . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). Since standards were issued on April 30, 1971, the State Plans 
were due on January 30, 1972 . 
.. [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i). 
" [d. § 1857c-5(e) . 
.. See text at notes 44-46, supra. 
" A good treatment of the importance of state and local regulations and enforcement in 
,determining relative levels of pollution can be found in COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORmEs, 
CRACKING DOWN: OIL REFINING AND POLLUTION CONTROL (1975) . 
.. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1975). 
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January 1, 1979, to be approved by EPA by June 30,1979. The plans 
were to provide for clean air by 1982,95 a delay of seven years from 
the date originally established by Congress in 1970.96 
Not only has the State Plan process failed to meet the deadlines 
for attaining primary standards, but the supposedly unitary and v 
comprehensive process itself has been dismembered as unantici-
pated problems arose. First, issues concerning transportation con-
trols97 and indirect source controlsD8 created disputes. Then, as var-
ious sources failed to meet specific emissions limitations and time-
tables, the issue of granting variances caused further difficulties. DD 
Later, environmentalists obtained a ruling that EPA could not ap-
prove portions of a State Plan which allowed significant deteriora-
tion of existing air quality. tOO Most recently, in response to industry's 
predisposition to expand, a policy of emissions off-sets, which allows 
new sources of pollution to become operative if existing sources 
compensate by matching the new pollution with a corresponding 
reduction in emissions, emerged. tOt In each instance, these develop-
ments occurred outside the original process of creating and imple-
menting State Plans, and by 1977, had effectively achieved a status 
which was nearly independent from the State Plans themselves. 
Thus, while State Plans still include individual emissions limita-
tions, compliance schedules and other strategies for attaining the 
ambient air quality standards, the unitary and comprehensive role 
of the State Plans in achieving the standards was destroyed because 
new, difficult issues were approached directly rather than through ./ 
the State Plan process. \02 
.. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172,91 Stat. 746 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7502) . 
.. See text at note 16, supra. Moreover, since it takes several years for old cars to be 
replaced by new ones, attainment of standards for auto-related pollutants (carbon monoxide 
and ozone) can be delayed until 1987. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 746-47 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7502). The parts of the 
State Plans pertaining to these pollutants may be delayed, ultimately, until 1982. [d. 
" See text at notes 225-60, infra. 
1M See text at notes 261-76, infra. 
uu See text at notes 104-23, infra. 
100 Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972); see generally text at notes 
302-33, infra. 
,., See text at notes 334-54, infra. 
102 The 1977 Amendments simply formalized this fragmentation by giving each major issue 
its own section of the law. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 
685 (1977). The "fragments" are found in the following sections: non-degradation - §§ 160-
69,91 Stat. 731-42 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-79); non-attainment - § 172,92 Stat. 
746 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7502); emissions offsets - §§ 165, 173,91 Stat. 735, 748 
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7503); delayed compliance - §§ 112, 118,91 Stat. 705, 
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Breaking a unitary process into separate components is partially 
a reasonable response to the actual pressures brought to bear on the 
states, EPA, the courts and Congress with respect to the difficult 
problems encountered in trying to achieve the goals of the Clean Air 
Act. However, when a unitary process becomes a piecemeal effort, 
the overall goal is easily lost and enforcement is more easily neutral-
ized, modified or abandoned. Furthermore, isolated enforcement 
failures do not create the same public reaction as a general rejection 
of clean air goals would cause. Fragmentation permits lip service to 
be given to the old goals, while political struggles won by polluters 
have been weakening, one by one, the mechanisms intended to at-
tain those goals. 
B. Controlling Industrial Emissions: Non-Compliance 
Non-compliance has been a persistent problem for EPA and the 
states. "Non-compliance," in this article, means the failure of spe-
cific polluters to meet the emissions limits and timetables for clean-
ing up emissions established by State Plans. Congress, EPA and 
J state and local agencies responded to non-compliance by creating 
various exceptions to the Act or State Plans for some of the largest 
polluters such as electric utilities, steel and non-ferrous metals 
producers, which were threatened with disruption by strict enforce-
ment of clean air standards. 103 
1. The Variance Loophole 
Delays in achieving compliance began when EPA allowed states 
to submit individual compliance schedules later than the other por-
tions of the State Plans. lo4 By late 1974, some states had not com-
pleted any compliance schedules, even though the deadline for com-
pliance was drawing near. I05 As the 1975 deadline for compliance 
approached, a controversy developed over the issue of "variances." 
; Variances are permits, granted by the states, which allow specific 
714 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7420); coal conversion and smelters - §§ 117, 122, 
91 Stat. 712, 722 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7419, 7425); indirect source controls - § 
108(e)(5), 91 Stat. 695 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7410). 
I .. See text at notes 124-61, infra. Electric utilities, steel and non-ferrous metal producers 
ranked first, second and fourth, respectively, in terms of total estimated costs of pollution 
_, abatement among United States industries. J. BOOTHE, CLEANING Up: THE COSTS OF REFINERY 
. POLLUTION CONTROL (1975). 
I •• Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution Control on Stationary Sources under the Clean Air 
"I. Amendments of 1970),4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 441, 446 n.15 (1975). 
I •• [d. 
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facilities to continue to emit greater amounts of pollutants than 
allowed by the applicable State Plan. lo8 States usually grant vari-
ances for a duration of one or two years at a time.107 Although vari-
ances obviously allowed certain plants to ignore emissions limits, 
they did not affect the ambient air quality standards themselves. 
The states generally took a pro-industry position, granting liberal 
variances on the basis of the economic burden and technological 
infeasibility of timely compliance. lOS The controversy over variances 
spawned two sets of court actions: the Natural Resources Defense 
Council (NRDC) initiated one, and utility and oil companies 
started the other. The lower courts were divided on the question 
whether variances were merely revisions of State Plans or were ac-
tions which modified Congressional deadJines for compliance and 
therefore required Congressional approval. I09 EPA supported the 
states' position, maintaining that state-issued variances were 
"revisions" of State Plans, and therefore subject only to EPA ap-
proval. The issue had serious ramifications-if variances were rig- j 
idly limited, thousands of major stationary sources would be threat-
ened. The cases culminated in two United States Supreme Court 
decisions,Train v. NRDCIIO and Union Electric Co. v. EPA. III 
The Supreme Court reached a decision favorable to the polluters./ 
in Train v. NRDCII2 by concurring with EPA's liberal view toward 
state-granted variances. The Court held that the variances did not 
conflict with the ability of the State Plan to make air quality meet 
the primary standards by the legislative deadline,1I3 reasoning that 
the states should be allowed "considerable latitude" in their pro-
grams. 1I4 This position, sensible enough on its face, is not tenable 
when considered in the context of the states' and EPA's capitulation 
to industry pressure. "[B]y striking the balance in favor of flexibil-
, .. See, e.g., Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 252 (1976). 
'07 See, e.g., id. 
'OIl "[Forty. eight) states submitted [State Plans) with language requiring the state air 
pollution control agency to consider economic factors in one stage or another of the implemen-
tation process." Kramer, supra note 4, at 179. 
, .. NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 494 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1974); 
NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1973); 
NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973). 
liD 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
"' 427 U.S. 246 (1976). For discussions of these two cases and their antecedents, see Kra-
mer, supra note 4, at 179-202; W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 238-45. See also English, supra 
note 55, at 626-27. 
112 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
113 See id. at 91. 
II. Id. at 87. 
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ity, the court shortened the odds on the standards being met and 
maintained . . . . "115 Indeed, the 1975 deadline was passing even 
as the Court made its decision. 
In Union Electric, the Court decided against industry's position 
that EPA should weigh economic and technological considerations 
in its approval of State Plans. 1I8 Petitioner, an electric utility com-
pany, sought a review of EPA's 1972 approval of Missouri's State 
Plan after EPA notified the company that its plants violated the 
emissions limitations contained in the plan in 1974.117 The company 
argued that economic and technological difficulties made compli-
ance with the emissions limitations impossible. \18 The Court held 
that "Congress intended claims of economic and technical infeasi-
bility to be wholly foreign to the Administrator's consideration of a 
state implementation plan."119 Thus, individual pollution sources 
could not challenge EPA's approval of State Plans on the basis of 
economic and technological considerations. 
\; Therefore, while states could grant variances as "revisions" of 
State Plans seemingly for whatever reasons they chose, EPA could 
not change State Plans because of a challenge to the Plans on the 
basis of economic or technological infeasibility. Unfortunately, 
these suits and conflicting lower court decisions on the issue of 
whether EPA could weigh economic and technological factorsl20 
"interfered severely with attainment and maintenance of primary 
standards within the prescribed timetable."t2t Also, the Court left 
a loophole for industrial delaying tactics, leaving undecided the 
question whether economic and technical considerations could enter 
into future judicial review or enforcement proceedings. l22 Then, as 
noted previously, in 1977 Congress introduced economic and tech-
nological considerations into the Clean Air Act by requiring Eco-
nomic Impact Assessments. 123 
II. W. RODGERS, supra note 16, at 241. 
"' Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265 (1976). 
117 [d. at 252. 
11M [d. at 253. 
III [d. at 256. 
120 See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and 
remanded, 427 U.S. 902 (1976); Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 
1975); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975); Buckeye Power Co. v. EPA, 
481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973); 
Getty Oil Co. v. EPA, 342 F. Supp. 1006 (D. Del. 1972). See also Kramer, supra note 4, at 
186-94. 
121 But see Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1976). 
122 Kramer, supra note 4, at 196-202. 
123 See note 84, supra. 
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2. Coal Conversion, Tall Stacks and Electric Utilities-Special . 
Dispensations 
The "energy crisis" of 1973-74 provided the justification for sev-
eral amendments which critically weakened the Clean Air Act. The ' 
energy crisis brought the Act into confrontation with an emergent 
energy supply promotion policy (nick-named "Project Independ-
ence") which emphasized the use of coal. 124 Enacted in response to 
the oil shortages of 1973-74, the Energy Supply and Environmental. 
Coordination Act of 1974125 (ESECA) empowered EPA to grant a 
"compliance date extension" to January 1, 1979 to any stationary 
source which used coal as a fuel or which converted to coal use}28 
The principal beneficiary of this policy was the electric utility in-· 
dustry, the largest user of coal. Since coal combustion is, aside from 
automobiles, the most prolific single source of air pollution in the 
United States,l27 and since the changeover from the use of coal to 
low-sulfur oil had been an important measure for reducing emis-
sions,l28 the ESECA provision was a major setback to clean air ef-
forts. 129 
Consistent with the ongoing national energy policy which pro-
moted the use of domestic coal,13o the 1977 Amendments continued .j 
the policy of extending compliance deadlines. The Amendments 
extended the compliance deadline for coal-burning facilities to De-
cember 31, 1980,131 two years later than allowed by ESECA; more-
over, the Amendments provided for the possibility of an additional 
three-year extension. Subject to certain restrictions, powerplants 
IZ4 Havemann & Phillips, Energy Report: Independence Blueprint Weighs Various Options, 
6 NAT'L J. REP. 1637 (1974). 
III Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974)(codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (1976) and 
amending various sections in 42 U.S.C.). 
III 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-l0(c)(1976)(as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974». 
See note 125, supra. 
117 Coal is the leading source of sulfur dioxide and particulates. It accounts for over half of 
the sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States. Ayres, supra note 104, at 442-43. 
128 Four hundred utilities had converted from coal to oil between 1965 and 1972. N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 10, 1974, at 4. 
121 The ESECA provision achieved by legislation what the utilities had been seeking by 
means of variances from State Plans. Most of the suits which sought delayed compliance were 
brought by utilities. English, supra note 55, at 621 n.I68. 
130 Berger, Reis & Rudolph, Inside Carter's Energy Plan, Not Man Apart, mid-June 1977, 
at 8, col. 1; Commoner, The Hidden Joker in Carter's Energy Deck, Washington Post, May 
29,1977, § B, at I, col. 4; Cockburn & Ridgeway, Carter's Powerless Energy Policy, N.Y. Rev. 
of Books, May 26, 1977, at 31. 
131 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 112,91 Stat. 705-07 (1977)(to 
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7413). 
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not in compliance with applicable emissions limitations also can 
escape legal action by converting to locally-produced coal. I32 
J Until very recently, the most effective method for controlling 
stack emissions of sulfur oxides from coal-burning powerplants was 
the installation of "scrubbers."133 The utility industry resisted such 
a measure on the grounds of cost and reliability,134 and instead ini-
tially favored a changeover to low-sulfur fuel (usually oil and gas). 
Such an approach was incorporated in most State Plans and ap-
proved by EPA, even though it soon became apparent that supplies 
of low-sulfur fuel were insufficient to supply the powerplants' 
needs. l35 The utilities then adopted the strategy of advocating a 
combination of intermittent control practices (in which they would 
curtail operations or switch to low-sulfur fuels during times of ad-
verse air conditions) and the use oft all stacks (which would disperse 
pollutants several hundred feet in the air). 138 Dispersals of sulfur 
dioxide, however, can produce harmful "acid rains" often hundreds 
of miles away from the source. 137 "[A]lthough the objections to 
dispersion are overwhelming, the immense financial interests of 
utilities and smelters in obtaining approval for tall stacks and 
[intermittent control practices] have kept alive the issue of their 
legality. "138 
J In NRDC v. EPA 139 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit ruled that intermittent control systems were accept-
able only when emissions reduction equipment was unavailable. 
Industry lobbying then succeeded in persuading the Ford Adminis-
tration to support another variance. In November, 1974 the Admin-
istration declared that it would allow use of intermittent control 
systems and tall stacks by isolated rural powerplants until 1985,140 
and in 1975, it proposed amendments to this effect for the Clean Air 
Act.141 However, the proposed amendments did not survive the 
ensuing change of administrations, and the 1977 Amendments ex-
'32 See id. § 122, 91 Stat. 722-24 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7425). 
'33 "Scrubbers" are flue-gas desulfurization devices; they work by spraying the stack gases 
with an alum solution. 
"" See Ayres, supra note 104, at 443-49. 
'3!l Id. at 446. 
",. Id. at 449-52. 
'37 Id. at 454. See also Likens, Acid Rain, 14 ENVIRONMENT 33 (1972). 
",. Ayres, supra note 104, at 455. 
'3' 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), modified sub nom. Train v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
"" U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 47 (1975). 
'" Energy Independence Act of 1975, Titles V & VI, Administration Proposals, Jan. 30, 
1975. 
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pressly prohibit tall stacks.142 Yet, the prohibition came about only 
after seven years of dalliance. 
Despite such delayed restrictions, the exemption for facilities 
which convert to burning coal has sheltered most non-complying 
utilities in the eastern United States, while "isolated rural power-
plants" (referring principally to the new facilities being constructed 
in the Colorado Plateau region) have found another loophole in the 
weakening of the Act's "non-degradation" policy.143 
3. Steel and Smelters - More Dispensations 
As a group, non-ferrous primary metal producers have played a 
major role in opposition to the Clean Air Act. One indication of their 
role is their appearance in many legal actions against EPA, such as 
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA. 144 Also, they joined with utilities 
in the controversy over tall stacks. Their resistance has not captured 
newspaper headlines to the same degree as that of the steel industry, 
but it is effective: Congress disallowed tall stacks as a pollution ./ 
control strategy in the 1977 Amendments,145 but it created a delayed 
compliance loophole for existing primary non-ferrous smelters. They 
can receive two extensions of compliance deadlines for sulfur diox-
ide emissions for periods up to January 1, 1988.'46 
The steel industry affords another glaring example of obstruction, 
one which has been carefully documented.147 Steel production is one 
of the major causes of air and water pollution in the United States, 148 
but because of the industry's economic problems149 as well as the 
enormous costs of reducing pollution,150 steel companies have con-
tinually avoided compliance with pollution control measures and 
have been a particular problem for regulators. 151 
'" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95·95, § 121, 91 Stat. 721 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7423). 
'" See Craig, Cloud on the Desert, 13 ENVIRONMENT 20 (1971). See also text at notes 302· 
33, infra. 
'" 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also note 53, supra. 
'" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95·95, § 121, 91 Stat. 721 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7423). 
'" Id. § 117,91 Stat. 712 (1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7419). 
'" COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRiORITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL STEEL (1972); COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC 
PRIORITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL STEEL UPDATE (1977); Greer, Obstacles to Taming Corporate Pol· 
luters: Water Pollution Politics in Gary, Indiana, 3 ENV. AFF. 199 (1973); Greer, Air Pollution 
and Corporate Power: Municipal Reform Limits in a Black City, 4 POLITICS & SOCIETY 183 
(1974). 
". Id. 
'" See P. SWEEZY & H. MAGDOFF, supra note 49. 
'''' See note 103, supra. 
'" A Council on Economic Priorities Study concluded that of the seven largest steel makers 
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United States Steel Corporation, by far the largest company in 
the industry, has also been one of the most egregious offenders. 152 
The corporation's facility at Gary, Indiana is the largest integrated 
steel plant in this country. Control efforts by local, state and federal 
officials had virtually no effect on conditions at the plant for the 
first ten years following enactment of the 1963 Clean Air Act.ls3 At 
the end of 1973, U.S. Steel ran out of time on a promise made eight 
years earlier to close its last open hearth furnaces at Gary. The 
company requested and received two six-month suspensions before 
EPA finally threatened to impose a paltry $250,000 fine. The com-
pany responded by closing down ten of the furnaces, which created 
a great deal of publicity over "lost jobs" and proved quite embar-
rassing for EPA.IM Even with this shutdown, however, emissions 
were still not in compliance with standards. In January, 1979, EPA 
once again took U.S. Steel to court, seeking $25,000 per day in fines. 
It was the Agency's eighth suit against the company in as many 
years. 155 
In another case against U.S. Steel, concerning its Clairton coke 
works near Pittsburgh, a three million dollar fine for violation of a 
1972 clean-up agreement was reduced to $750,000 when U.S. Steel 
signed a new agreement in late 1976.158 The company reportedly 
agreed to invest $600 million in new coke ovens and remodeling in 
exchange for immunity from prosecution for a period of three to ten 
years. 157 Considering the past record of unmet promises, the com-
pany appears to have made a good deal for itself. 
J For a corporation of U.S. Steel's size and presence, recalcitrance 
in the face of clean air regulation is generated by a combination of 
corporate arrogancel58 and real economic pressures of competition in 
a declining industry. In lesser companies, financial precariousness 
threatens factory closure, even bankruptcy, and severe dislocation 
only one, Armco, made any significant progress in pollution. control between 1972 and 1977. 
COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL STEEL UPDATE (1977). 
102 Council on Economic Priorities characterized U.S. Steel's environmental position as 
follows: "litigate first and install controls only as a last resort." ld. at 169. 
'.3 Greer, Air Pollution and Corporate Power: Municipal Reform Limits in a Black City, 4 
POLITICS & SOCIETY 183 (1974). 
15' San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 30, 1974, at 6, col. 1; U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 50 (1975). 
15. Not Man Apart, mid-Feb. 1979, at 6, col. 4. 
'" San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 31, 1976, at 6, col. 6. 
'" ld. 
15K For ample evidence of U.S. Steel's arrogant use of political power see Greer, supra note 
147 (both references). 
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for dependent workers and communities. Government regulators 
either recoil from precipitating such crises or are prevented from 
taking action by strong political coalitions of business and labor.159 
A good example of such governmental withdrawal is the case of 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, an ailing corporation which was fined 
$39.8 million for its longstanding violation of air pollution regula-
tions in Pennsylvania. 160 The state government intervened to reduce 
the fine to only $100,000 and to provide $28.5 million in federal loan 
guarantees to help Wheeling-Pittsburgh comply with air pollution 
standards. 181 In this instance, the company not only was able to 
delay compliance, but also managed to shift part of the costs to the 
government and its taxpayers. 
These examples of individual corporate resistance are a signal to 
businesses that a threatened plant closure may help to stave off the 
regulators. Such action tends to focus public disfavor on environ-
mental regulations rather than on the corporation's prolonged re-
sistance to pollution control, or else to shift the costs of compliance 
to the public. 
4. Continued Non-Compliance-Retreating Deadlines 
The original attainment date for meeting primary ambient air 
standards was 1975, with the possibility of postponement to 1976 or 
extension to 1977 .182 Acting under considerable political pressure 
and time constraints, EPA tended to grant extensions and post-
ponements freely. 183 This liberal granting of extensions plus the 
favorable result in the variance controversy in 1975,184 reduced the 
pressure on non-complying industries. 
The need somehow to accommodate non-complying industries 
arose again as the extended deadlines approached. In 1977, official 
figures indicated that 1400 major polluters were not in compliance 
with emissions limitations and timetables,165 and hence potentially 
faced fines or forced closures. Senator Muskie, in his comments on 
the Conference Committee Report for the 1977 Amendments, put 
'" The best example of this problem involves water pollution control efforts in the Mahon-
ing Valley of Ohio, a steel-producing region_ See U-S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 12, 162 (1976). 
,~, Wall St. J., March 21, 1978, at 14, col. 4. 
'" [d. 
'" See note 16, supra. 
,8:, See text at notes 94-96, supra. 
'" See text at notes 104-23, supra. 
'" See 123 CONGo REC. S13697 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977)(remarks of Sen. Muskiel. 
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great emphasis on "an expeditious clean-up schedule"166 for indus-
tries not in compliance. However, Congress extended the deadline 
j for compliance yet another year, to July 1, 1979.167 If the 1979 dead-
line is not met, violators will face a three-to-five year compliance 
schedule designed to make them meet standards; during that period 
they will be required to pay a penalty.168 This approach eliminates 
some of the financial incentive to avoid compliance, but its effec-
tiveness depends, as always, on the willingness and capacity of the 
government to enforce the statute. 
C. Controlling Motor Vehicle Emissions 
The Clean Air Act attempts to control pollution from mobile 
sources chiefly by reducing the emissions of new passenger cars sold 
in this country. Efforts to limit emissions from other types of motor 
vehicles and aircraft, to eliminate dangerous fuel additives, to re-
trofit existing vehicles with smog control devices and to reduce the 
total number of vehicles on the road and miles driven have comple-
mented the primary strategy. 169 All of the control programs have 
fared poorly. 170 
1. New Automobile Emissions - Ever-Receding Deadlines 
The automobile emissions control effort is perhaps the most 
prominent part of the whole clean air regulatory effort.171 It is also 
the best example of erosion of the law in the form of ever-receding 
deadlines. This is not to say that some progress has not been made 
'" Id. at S13698. 
,87 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 112, 91 Stat. 705 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7413). 
'" Id. § 118,91 Stat. 714 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7420). The penalty is essentially an 
eff1uent charge. For a discussion of eff1uent charges, see generally Mills & Wright, supra note 
48, at 348-42l. 
'" Non-automotive vehicle emissions controls and retrofitting of existing vehicles with 
smog devices are not discussed in this article. Fuel additives are discussed in text at notes 
195-203, infra; transportation and indirect source controls are discussed in text at notes 225-
76, infra. 
1711 See note 169, supra. It should be added that the main reason for not discussing non-
automotive vehicle emissions control and retrofitting is that very little has happened in these 
areas. Retrofitting, the only mobile source analog to the control of existing industrial emis-
sions, suffers from problems of cost, regressive economic impact, difficulty of enforcement and 
time-lag. See COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFrING RESEARCH FUND, THE AUTOMOBILE 
AND THE REGULATION OF ITs IMPACT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 6-84 (1974). 
17' Automobiles account for 70 percent of carbon monoxide emissions, 50 percent of hydro-
carbon emissions and 30 percent of nitrogen oxides emissions nationwide. San Francisco 
Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 3. 
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in lowering new car emissions;172 nonetheless, the goals of the Act 
have not yet been met and the task grows more difficult as they are 
neared. 173 
The history of vehicle emissions control divides into three stages. 
The first stage begins with passage of the 1970 Act which mandated 
a ninety percent reduction in hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide by 
1975, and a similar reduction in oxides of nitrogen by 1976.174 Con-
gress initially gave EPA authority to grant a one-year extension of 
these deadlines under certain restrictive conditions. 175 Not surpris-
ingly, the automobile manufacturers, which have a long history of 
opposition to pollution controls,178 immediately applied for a one-
year extension of the deadlines.171 EPA refused the industry's re-
quest but, in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 178 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
manded the denial to EPA for further explanation of its administra-
tive decision. 179 Faced with a very onerous burden of proof with 
respect to certain aspects of the denial and further hampered by a 
directive to respond within a limited time period, EPA opted to 
grant one-year extensions of the emissions deadlines,180 to 1976 for 
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide, and to 1977 for nitrogen ox-
ides. lsl 
Within one year, however, the "energy crisis" of 1973-74 added a 
completely new dimension to the regulatory effort. The government 
172 By 1975, hydrocarbon emissions were 83 percent lower per mile than in 1970. U.S. DEP'T 
OF TRANSP., EPA & U.S. FED. ENERGY ADMIN., AN ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE MOTOR VEHICLE 
EMISSION STANDARDS 20 (May 19, 1977). 
'" The marginal costs of improvements in remaining emissions is extremely high relative 
to previous improvements. See generally Mills & Wright, supra note 48. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1857f·1(b)(1)(1970). 
'" [d. § 1857f·l(b)(5). 
'70 See J.C. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 6 at 44·55. 
171 For a discussion of the events from 1970 to 1975, see O'Connor, The Automobile Contro· 
versy - Federal Control of Vehicular Emissions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 661, 664·71 (1975). 
,7M 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
,70 [d. at 647·50. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 212·17. The court apparently based its 
decision on the technical feasibility of achieving the emissions standards. Relying on the 
findings of a National Academy of Sciences study which contradicted EPA's opinion on the 
potential for technical change in engine design, the court questioned whether the industry 
could meet the standards. It is submitted that the authors of this study took a remarkably 
narrow view of their mandate, ruling out most of the innovative possibilities and taking an 
unduly sympathetic view of the industry's constraints. The court was afraid of the disruptive 
effects of EPA's power effectively to close down the auto industry if it did not achieve the 
standard, given the court's judgment that compliance was not technically feasible and failure 
therefore likely. 
"" Kramer, supra note 4, at 216·17. 
'" 38 Fed. Reg. 22,474 (1973); id. at 10,318. 
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feared that pollution controls, which lowered fuel economy, would 
exacerbate fuel supply problems. The Energy Supply and Environ-
mental Coordination Act of 1974 (ESECA) reflected such concerns 
by setting interim standards of a sixty-seven percent reduction for 
1975 (1976 for nitrogen oxides), and by extending the ultimate dead-
lines one more year, to 1977 (1978 for nitrogen oxides).ls2 
The second stage of the history of vehicle emissions, controls 
started in 1974 and continued until the enactment of the 1977 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act. Beginning with 1975 model cars, 
a new type of "add-on" device came into general use: the catalytic 
converter. Affixed to a car's tailpipe, the catalytic converter pro~ 
motes a chemical reaction which produces water and carbon dioxide 
from unburned hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and oxygen. It is 
ironic, but important, to note that: (1) EPA's denial of the indus-
try's application for extended deadlines was remanded in 
Intemational Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshausl83 partly because the 
court questioned EPA's judgment that the 1975 deadlines were fea-
sible-a judgment which EPA based on the potential use of cataly-
tic converters; and (2) although General Motors claimed in the suit 
that it would incur "an unreasonable risk of business catastrophe" 
if it were forced to put converters on its 1975 model automobiles, it 
then introduced catalytic converters on eighty-five percent of its 
1975 cars only two months after defeating the requirement! 184 
The catalytic converter also has its limitations. ls5 It produces 
thirty-five times the amount of sulfuric acid mist produced by an 
unequipped vehicle, and its effective life is probably not much over 
50,000 miles. ls8 Furthermore, the more efficient, higher temperature 
combustion which is required with the use of the converters in-
creases output of nitrogen oxides and therefore renders catalytic 
converters ineffective in achieving nitrogen oxide standards. 
In anticipation of the approaching 1977/78 deadlines, the automo-
bile industry began agitating for further postponement.IS7 In debate 
lIZ 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l(b)(1976)(as amended by Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974». 
lIS 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
, .. See Ditlow, Federal Regulation of Motor Vehicle Emissions Under the Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1970, 4 EcoLOGY L.Q. 495, 515 (1975). 
, .. Furthermore a considerable portion of the emissions reductions cannot be credited to 
the converters but to greater fuel efficiency and other design modifications mandated by law 
since the energy crisis. Dewees, The Costs and Technology of Pollution Abatement, in 
ApPROACHES TO CONTROLLING AIR POLLUTION 312-23 (A. Friedlander ed. 1978). 
, .. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1977). 
,.7 Asbell, The Outlawing of Next Year's Cars, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, (Magazine) at 
126. 
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over both the 1976 and 1977 versions of the Clean Air Amendments, 
auto manufacturers predicted dire consequences for the national 
economy if they were forced to meet the approaching compliance 
dates. 188 Presidents Ford and Carter voiced a similar concern,189 and 
the industry continued to exert pressure by alternately threatening 
to stop production and refusing to make improvements in 1978 
model cars. The President of General Motors was quoted as saying, 
"They can close the plants. They can get someone in jail-maybe 
me. But we're going to make [1978] cars to 1977 standards."11IO 
The resulting compromise embodied in the 1977 Amendments 
severely delayed implementation of the standards. The ninety per-
cent reduction in hydrocarbon emissions, originally targeted for 
1975, has been put back to 1981, and the attainment of the carbon 
monoxide standard also has been postponed until 1981, with an 
interim reduction of eighty percent required by 1980. 191 Further-
more, EPA again has the option of retaining the eighty percent 
reduction standard for two additional years if it believes the tech-
nology does not exist to meet the 1981 standard. 192 A four-year 
waiver of the nitrogen oxide standard is authorized for diesel engines 
and any other innovative technology that may be introduced. 193 No 
standard for sulfuric acid emissions from tailpipes equipped with 
catalytic converters has been established. 
Supporters of the clean air campaign had no illusions as to the 
capitulation to auto industry pressure represented by the 1977 
Amendments. Senator Edmund Muskie, leader of the clean air 
forces in the Senate, made a telling observation about the erosion 
of the law: 
I would not have believed in 1970 that we would ultimately provide the 
auto industry with a longer period of time to comply with emission 
standards than the manufacturers themselves requested of President 
Nixon in 1969. So be it. We have finally completed the last round. 194 
'" [d. at 127. 
'" [d. at 41. 
"" [d. at 126. 
'" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No'. 95-95, § 201, 91 Stat. 751 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7521). 
'" [d. at 91 Stat. 752. 
,0:, See id. at 91 Stat. 752-53. The introduction of diesel engines in passenger cars as a 
measure for economizing fuel consumption raises new problems of potential danger to human 
health. Diesel fuel is not as highly refined as gasoline and EPA is just beginning to conduct 
tests on diesel fuel and its complex hydrocarbon emissions. See San Francisco Chronicle, July 
17, 1977, (This World section) at 33, col. 1. EPA proposed the first standard for diesel fuel 
emissions on January 11, 1979. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 11, 1979, at 6, col. 5. 
, .. 123 CONGo REC. S13702 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977)(remarks of Sen. Muskie). 
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Senator Muskie was shortsighted on his last point; the final round 
is by no means complete. The second round is over and the third is 
just beginning. As the 1981 deadlines draw closer, the same pres-
sures as before will undoubtedly be brought to bear on EPA and 
Congress, with the likely result that the present deadlines will re-
cede even further into the future or that the emissions standards 
themselves will be abandoned for more modest goals. 
2. Fuel Additives 
Automotive fuel contains additives which increase engine per-
formance. The most notorious additive, lead, comprises one-third of 
particulate emissions from car engines and is a well-known threat 
to human health. 18s The 1970 Clean Air Act authorized EPA to 
regulate lead and other fuel additives in order to protect human 
health,1I8 but the petroleum industry has strenuously opposed 
EPA's efforts.187 The only successful limitation on lead to date has 
been the introduction of a separate grade of lead-free gasoline to 
prevent the breakdown of catalytic converters on new automobiles. 
This regulation, which became effective only in July, 1974,188 was 
sustained over industry protest in Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA. 188 
Efforts to phase out lead in all grades of gasoline in the interests 
of public health (as opposed to the prevention of harm to catalytic 
converters) has proceeded with much difficulty. EPA's lead emis-
sions standard was finally upheld by a sharply divided court after 
a series of court battles in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA.200 However, the 
industry subsequently persuaded EPA that enforcement of the stan-
dard would cause serious fuel shortages, so EPA relaxed its enforce-
ment schedule by extending the final deadline and eliminating in-
terim standards. 201 
EPA did not issue a hazardous substance standard for lead in air 
or in emissions from stationary sources until forced to do so by an 
environmentalist suit in 1976.202 Nor has it regulated any other po-
115 O'Connor, supra note 177. The fact that lead is life-threatening, however, had to be 
reproven by EPA with respect to the effects of inhalation of lead in the ambient air. See U.S. 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REpORT 9-10 (1976). 
, .. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6(c)(1970). 
117 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
, •• 40 C.F.R. §§ SO.2(g), 80.22, 80.24, 80.25 (1977). 
, .. 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
200 541 F.2d 1 (1976), cert. denied 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
21" San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 25, 1976, at 2, col. 4 . 
• 2 NRDC v. Train, 6 ENVIR. L. REp. 20366 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
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tentially dangerous additives besides lead, such as nickel or ben-
zene. In addition, many of the new lead substitutes, such as man-
ganese, are extremely dangerous in their own right, so much so that 
in 1977 Congress limited the amount of manganese that could be 
added to fuel and placed the burden of proof on the manufacturer 
to show that other fuel additives do not harm emission-control de-
vices.203 However, Congress did not require manufacturers to bear 
the burden of proving that additives are not harmful to human 
health-the central question in the debate over fuel additives. 
D. Transportation and Urban Growth: Early Planning Strategies 
In addition to providing for straightforward emissions controls on 
industry and motor vehicles, the Clean Air Act also creates the 
possibility of undertaking more far-reaching planning measures to 
reduce air pollution.204 These multi-faceted planning measures have 
the potential for dealing with the environmental effects of urban-
industrial growth as a whole, but they also have the ability to gener-
ate the most controversy over the legitimate powers granted by the 
nominally single-purpose Clean Air Act. Their fate clearly reveals 
the inherent limitations of the regulatory solution to air pollution: 
the Clean Air Act appears to be unable to introduce overall urban 
and economic planning into American society. 
Until 1975, the chief planning question revolved around whether 
government should take an aggressive stance toward land use and 
transportation decisions in the interest of attaining clean air stan-
dards. This question predominantly concerned motor vehicle emis-
sions limitations. It did not, as yet, involve to any significant degree 
the question of maintaining air quality gains in the face of continu-
ing industrial expansion.205 
1. Land Use and Transportation Controls - An Introduction 
The 1970 Clean Air Act contains two provisions relating to land 
use and transportation controls. First, it requires that State Plans 
include the following: "emissions limitations, schedules, and time-
tables for compliance with such limitations, and such other mea-
sures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of 
2"" Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 222, 91 Stat. 762 (1977)(to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7545). 
"" See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)(1970). 
"'" See Section III (E), infra for a discussion of post-1975 developments regarding planning 
and industrial growth. 
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primary and secondary standards, including, but not limited to, 
land use and transportation controls."206 Second, the Act calls for 
review of new pollution sources before their construction commences 
("pre-construction review"), requiring that the State Plan contain: 
[a] procedure ... for review, prior to construction or modification, of 
the location of new sources [of pollution, which] shall provide for ade-
quate authority to prevent the construction or modification of any new 
source to which a standard of performance will apply at any location 
which the state determines will prevent the attainment or maintenance 
of a national ambient air quality primary or secondary standard.207 
The interpretation and enforcement of this authority to control land 
use and transportation and to review the location of new sources of 
pollution have generated a heated debate. The controversy has fo-
cused on whether EPA and the states only have the legal authority 
to place specific controls on specific facilities or whether they may 
perform comprehensive land use planning, including modification 
of housing, employment and transportation patterns. More funda-
mentally, there is a question as to whether they can, in practice, do 
either, given the limited power and purpose of the Clean Air Act. 
The legislative history of the Act is inconclusive regarding Con-
gressional intent. The original House version of the Act made no 
provision for land use controls.206 The Senate added such a provi-
sion, but it was merely designed to prevent interference with the 
attainment and maintenance of clean air standards.209 Furthermore, 
the committee hearings and floor debates give little indication as to 
how EPA and the states are to administer these controls.210 
EPA did not take the initiative in enforcing its possible authority 
over transportation and land use in reviewing initial State Plans. 
Such reticence may be due partially to the vagueness of EPA's role 
as defined by Congress and partially to its reluctance to undertake 
unpopular actions in order to clarify its proper role. In NRDC v. 
EPA, 211 environmentalists sued for enforcement of this portion of the 
Act, and obtained a ruling that EPA had granted unwarranted ex-
tensions of deadlines for submission of transportation control por-
... 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)(1970). 
29' [d. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D)(emphasis added) . 
... See H.R. REp. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971) . 
... See S. REp. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1970). 
219 For a discussion and references see Mandelker & Rothschild, The Role at Land-Use 
Controls in Combating Air Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 235 
(1973). 
'" 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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tions of State Plans and had given inadequate attention to provi-
sions in State Plans for maintenance of air standards. Although the 
court stated that air quality maintenance provisions had been inad-
equate, it did not specify proper measures for maintaining air qual-
ity. The confusion over the exact measures required in State Plans 
was compounded by the decision in Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, 
Inc. v. EPA, 212 which held that land use and transportation controls 
were not mandated if other measures would suffice to achieve and 
maintain air standards.213 Thus EPA was left to devise the means 
by which air quality maintenance was to be achieved without guid-
ance by either the court or Congress.214 
Responding to the decision in NRDC v. EPA, EPA toughened its 
stance in 1973 and, after disapproving all portions of State Plans 
dealing with air quality maintenance,215 issued new guidelines con-
cerning land use and transportation controls.218 These guidelines, as 
initially conceived, would have amounted to "a directive to the 
states to implement statewide land use controls."217 Their scope was 
considerably reduced in the course of the year, however. The final 
regulations encompassed three main elements:218 transportation 
controls;219 indirect source controls;220 and air quality maintenance 
plans (AQMP's). The first two dealt almost entirely with vehicular 
emissions. The AQMP's were a way of identifying those regions with 
severe air quality problems which would require extraordinary steps 
to achieve air standards and maintain them over the following ten 
years,221 and, theoretically, encompassed more than transportation 
and indirect source controls.222 In practice, however, they have 
2IZ 480 F.2d 972, 978 n.21 (3d Cir. 1973). 
21:1 In a later decision, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 
504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), stated that EPA could promulgate regulations resembling local 
zoning ordinances for the purpose of reducing emissions. Id. at 648. Although the decision 
allowed EPA to designate different areas for different uses, the court did not give EPA the 
power to prohibit a given facility from locating in an urban area. Yet, whatever the extent of 
these quasi-zoning powers, they have never been exercised by EPA. 
2" See text at notes 215-24, infra. 
215 Danielson, Control of Complex Emissions Sources - A Step Toward Land Use 
Planning. 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 693, 696 (1975). 
211 38 Fed. Reg. 6279 (1973). 
ZI7 Danielson, supra note 215, at 699. 
'" 38 Fed. Reg. 15,834, 15,836-37 (June 18, 1973)(amending 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.11, 51.18); 38 
Fed. Reg. 7323 (March 20, 1973) . 
... See text at notes 225-60, infra. 
m See text at notes 261-76, infra. 
221 See 38 Fed. Reg. 15,834 (June 18, 1973)(amending 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.11, 51.18). EPA 
determined that 66 metropolitan areas would require Air Quality Maintenance Plans. 
222 Danielson, supra note 215, at 704. See also note 270, infra. 
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served merely as an umbrella within the State Plan process, while 
the real issues of implementation have been, first, transportation 
and indirect source controls, and, later, new source performance 
standards223 and emissions offsets.224 
2. Transportation Controls 
As previously noted, State Plans were authorized, under the 
Clean Air Act, to include transportation controls as a means for 
attaining and maintaining primary and secondary standards.225 The 
legislative history of the 1970 Act shows that Congress well under-
stood "transportation controls" to include a variety of possible 
strategies, such as vehicle maintenance, controls on vehicle use, the 
alteration of transportation patterns and, consequently, the altera-
tion of spatial patterns of employment, residence and the like. 22ft 
Since the space-extensive, automobile-intensive nature of most 
large American cities227 creates a situation where, even if auto 
emission standards were met by all new vehicles, ambient air stan-
dards would still not be met, and thus supplementary transporta-
tion controls are necessary. EPA originally estimated that thirty-
one metropolitan areas would not be able to meet air quality stan-
dards without special restrictions on traffic; subsequently, it raised 
the estimate to sixty-three.228 The Agency calculates that such limi-
tations could lower total auto emissions by almost thirty percent. 229 
The biggest offenders and the main test cases for this form of regula-
tion were New York City and Los Angeles, which have by far the 
worst levels of carbon monoxide and photochemical oxidants, re-
spectively, in the country.230 
223 See text at notes 227-41, infra. 
22' See text at notes 334-54, infra. 
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)(1970). 
m W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 310. What Congress apparently did not appreciate was 
that limiting the use of the automobile is a broad planning question, not a narrow technical 
concern, and any attempt to restrict drastically the patterns of movement and spatial organi-
zation of the city represents a fundamental challenge to American economy and culture 
through its geography. 
227 See Walker & Large, The Economics of Energy Extravagance, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 963 
(1975) . 
... San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 3. 
22. Id. 
230 Motor vehicles account for 95 percent of carbon monoxide, 65 percent of hydrocarbon, 
40 percent of nitrogen oxides and 50 percent of photochemical smog in New York. 5 NRDC 
NEWSLE'ITER 2 (Fall 1976). For Los Angeles the figures are 97 percent carbon monoxide, 87 
percent hydrocarbon, 75 percent nitrogen oxides, 34 percent particulates and 15 percent 
sulphur dioxide. Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to 
Achieve the Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537, 545 n.40 (1975). 
1978] CLEAN AIR ACT 223 
Each state had the responsibility for including transportation 
control strategies in its State Plan. Such strategies were known as 
the Regional Air Quality Transportation Control Plan (Transporta-
tion Plan), and were later included in the overall Air Quality Main-
tenance Plan approach. Initial steps to implementing transporta-
tion controls were not encouraging. First, EPA quickly granted a 
one-year extension (to January, 1973) for submission of the Trans-
portation Plan. 231 Second, it permitted a two-year extension of the 
statutory deadlines for achieving ambient standards on automobile 
related pollutants to those states in which emissions controls on new 
cars would not be sufficient to attain primary air quality stan-
dards.232 However, the decisions in Riverside v. Ruckelshaus233 and 
NRDC v. EPA,234 suits brought by local communities and environ-
mentalists, forced a reluctant EPA to implement transportation 
controls where necessary in order to achieve timely compliance with 
primary standards. EPA hastily issued proposed regulations23S de-
manding new Transportation Plans from the states. 
EPA's guidelines for developing a Transportation Plan suggested 
a large number of possible methods of reducing automobile traffic, 
including bus and carpool lanes, bridge tolls, restrictions on the 
number of parking spaces, parking surcharges and even gasoline 
rationing. 238 These methods fall into three general categories: (1) 
improvements of traffic flows; (2) increasing car occupancy and use 
of mass transit; and (3) discouraging passenger vehicle usage alto-
gether. 237 
When the states finally submitted revised Transportation Plans, 
they invariably either arrived after the extended deadline and/or 
were woefully inadequate. 238 Only New York City ever submitted an 
231 37 Fed. Reg. 19,844 (1972). 
232 [d. 
233 4 ERC 1728 (D. Cal. 1972). 
234 475 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
235 38 Fed. Reg. 6290 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 15,834 (1973)(final regulations). 
238 See W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 313 n.14. Among the 31 cities which required Trans-
portation Plans, EPA originally estimated that 24 would have to restrict parking, 28 needed 
retrofitting and maintenance inspections, 19 would have to institute preferential lanes for 
buses and car-pools, seven to ban cars from some streets, seven to restrict motorcycles, five 
to limit truck delivery hours, three to have parking surcharges, and 13 to have gasoline 
rationing. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 4. 
237 These categories are suggested by W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 315. Two features of 
the Transportation Plans, inspection/retrofitting and vapor control, are peripheral to trans-
portation planning per se, and therefore are not discussed in this article. 
23' [d. at 313. 
224 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 7:189 
acceptable Transportation Plan on its own. 239 Thus, EPA was re-
quired to formulate its own stringent measures. 
A dramatic example is provided by EPA's experience in Los An-
geles. 240 During 1973, the Agency issued three successive Transpor-
tation Plans for the Los Angeles basin, whose draconian measures 
generated a widespread public uproar.241 Literal enforcement ofthe 
Clean Air Act demanded that total vehicle miles traveled in the 
basin be reduced by approximately eighty percent. EPA initially 
proposed a gasoline rationing scheme to achieve the reduction,242 a 
proposal which, as one observer noted, "the administrator, in order 
to discharge his duties under the Act, was driven to promulgate 
[but which] he and everyone else recognized as a patent absurd-
ity."243 In the final version of the plan, "the strongest and most 
unpopular anti-driving measures of the earlier proposals were de-
ferred or eliminated."244 Transportation controls and EPA had suc-
cumbed in this crucial confrontation with America's premier auto-
mobile city. 
In addition, judicial pressure against transportation controls was 
mounting. In South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,245 the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals set aside a Transportation Control Plan approved 
by EPA for the Boston area. The court based its action on a finding 
that the Agency had not adequately rebutted opponents' claims 
that the plan was based on isolated and insufficient monitoring data 
and was otherwise technically flawed. The "court's concern with 
harsh economic and social impact of the plan was an evident factor 
in its willingness to probe technical details."248 
Soon thereafter, Congress intervened in the transportation control 
controversy through the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordi-
nation Act of 1974247 which amended the Clean Air Act to provide 
... 5 NRDC NEWSLETl'ER 2 (Fall 1976). See text at notes 250-55, infra. 
24. For a good discussion of the Los Angeles case, see Chernow, supra note 230. See also 
Bland, Smog Control in Los Angeles County: A Critical Analysis of Emission Control 
Programs, 28 PROFESSIONAL GEOGRAPHER 283 (1976). 
24' See 38 Fed. Reg. 2194, 2195, 2199 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 17,683 (1973); 38 Fed. Reg. 31,232 
(1973). 
'" Chernow, supra note 230, at 550. 
24' Id. at 552. 
24' Bland, supra note 240, at 286-87 . 
... 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1973). 
'" Stewart, Judging the Imponderables of Environmental Policy: Judicial Review Under 
the Clean Air Act, in APPROACHES TO CONTROU.ING AIR POU.UTI0N 68, 91 (A. Friedlander, ed. 
1978). 
217 Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 Stat. 246 (1974)(codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-98 (1976) and 
amending various sections in 42 U.S.C.). 
1978] CLEAN AIR ACT 225 
that parking controls could only be enforced with the consent of 
local government. 248 This statute effectively eliminated the key 
strategy of parking controls as a part of transportation planning and 
showed Congress' reluctance to back EPA in this area. Because of 
this lack of support and because the Clean Air Act deadlines were 
generally being deferred as 1975 approached,249 the pressure for 
transportation controls diminished. 
Beginning in 1975, a second round of transportation planning 
began with New York City at the center of the controversy. In 1973, 
the Lindsay administration had drawn up a far-reaching and ac-
ceptable Transportation Plan, but did not enforce it.250 Friends of 
the Earth sued to have the plan implemented. 251 In 1975, EPA reluc-
tantly undertook the task but only succeeded in forcing the city to 
implement eight of its thirty-seven planned strategies.252 Friends of 
the Earth sued again, only to be blocked by a district court which 
was eventually reversed by the Court of Appeals. 253 The Court of 
Appeals later forced the city administration, despite its opposition, 
to take action on the 1973 Transportation Plan. 254 The 1977 Amend-
ments, however, gave the city authority to delete the most contro-
versial part of the plan: tolls on the East River bridges.255 
Other EPA efforts to mobilize enforcement of transportation con-
trols, without parking surcharges, met with similar difficulty. Sev-
eral states sued to bar enforcement of Transportation Plans, arguing 
that specific provisions for traffic controls had to be enacted by the 
state legislatures and that EPA therefore lacked authority to force 
the states to adopt such provisons. The states' position was upheld 
by three courts of appeals. 256 The Supreme Court vacated the lower 
••• [d. at § 4(bHcodified in 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(2)(c)(1976)) . 
... See text at notes 171-94, supra . 
... 5 NRDC NEWSLETI'ER 2-3 (Fall 1976). See also Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 
1118, 1126 (2d Cir. 1974) . 
.. , Friends of the Earth v. Wilson, 389 F. Supp. 1394, 1395-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) . 
... See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) . 
... [d . 
... Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (1977). See also Not Man Apart, at 8, col. 1 
(July-Aug. 1977) . 
... Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(d)(3), 91 Stat. 694, 695 
(1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C § 7410). Areas with especially severe oxident and carbon 
monoxide problems may be subject to a deadline extended as late as Dec. 31, 1987. [d. § 
1296(b), 91 Stat. 745, 746-47 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7502). The state must submit a 
plan revision in 1979 requiring implementation of all reasonably available control measures 
in such an area and a further revision in 1982, if the 1979 measures are insufficient. [d. The 
1982 revision must require implementation of all available measures to attain the primary 
standards. [d . 
... See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); Arizona v. EPA, 521 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 
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courts' judgments and remanded the proposed Transportation 
Plans to the appeals courts for consideration of mootness because 
EPA conceded that its regulations were invalid unless modified. 257 
The Court refused the government's invitation to pass upon the 
EPA regulations because such an action would amount to an 
"advisory opinion."258 Thus, the issue of EPA's authority to require 
such controls was ultimately left unresolved. In the meantime, little 
had been accom plished. 
The actual achievements of transportation planning are few. As 
of 1977 several states have instituted carpooling incentive programs; 
some cities have provided special traffic lanes for preferred vehicles; 
inspection-maintenance programs exist in only three states, while 
some other states have voluntary programs. 259 As one EPA official 
admitted, "the fact of the matter is that not a lot has occurred. If a 
state doesn't have a real commitment for transportation controls, 
there's not a hell of a lot the EPA can do about it."2RO 
3. Indirect Source Controls 
The Clean Air Act spawned another land use planning and trans-
portation control strategy commonly known as Indirect Source Con-
trol.2R1 Indirect sources are those facilities or structures which at-
tract automobiles or other vehicular traffic but do not themselves 
emit pollutants in significant amounts; they include highways, 
parking structures, commercial or industrial facilities, sports or rec-
reation complexes, airports and office buildings. Regulation of such 
sources attempts to control the indirect effects of the siting of new 
industrial and other large-scale facilities rather than focusing on the 
impact of their direct emissions. 
Indirect source review evolved from the general land use and 
transportation controls provision of the Clean Air Act, which itself 
does not explicitly mandate such a measure.282 The courts initially 
upheld EPA's authority to institute this sort of control mechanism 
concurrently with their approval of transportation controls.283 
1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Maryland v. EPA, 530 
F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975). All vacated and remanded, EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). 
'57 EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1977) . 
... [d . 
... San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1977, at 6, col. 3. 
:zoo [d. 
20' For a discussion of Indirect Source Controls, see Danielson, supra note 215. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B)(1970). See text at notes 206-24, supra. The power to regu-
late indirect sources falls under new source pre-construction review. Danielson, supra note 
215, at 697. 
213 See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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A strong political backlash against indirect source controls arose 
very quickly as a part of the general antipathy toward all transpor-
tation controls, especially parking controls.2M The courts, which 
were originally responsible for pushing EPA toward use of such con-
trols, did not subsequently support EPA's efforts. In Movement 
Against Destruction v. Volpe, 285 the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland permitted construction of an interstate 
highway in Baltimore, claiming that the environmentalists had 
failed to establish that the highway itself would result in violation 
of air standards. Furthermore, in Citizen's Association of George-
town v. Washington, D. C. 288 the court ruled against specific indirect 
source controls, judging their impacts to be highly speculative. 
At the same time, EPA's regulations regarding indirect source 
controls themselves proved very controversial and had to be revised 
six times between April, 1973 and July, 1974.287 The Agency's origi-
nal draft guidelines288 called for virtual statewide land use controls 
- a measure which was completely unacceptable to most states. 2ft. 
Nonetheless, such far-reaching measures are not inconsistent with 
EPA's statutory mandate. Later revisions yielded much less com-
prehensive measures, and were confined to vehicular traffic con-
troJ.270 Yet, even these weaker regulations were never implemented. 
States were reluctant to take aggressive action, only three states 
submitted acceptable AQMP's on schedule,271 thereby leaving EPA 
the duty to formulate its own plans. EPA reacted by granting delays 
in implementation as standard procedure in 1974.272 Finally, when 
H' In terms of regulating parking facilities, indirect source controls and transportation 
controls were treated as identical, administratively. W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 327. 
H' 361 F. Supp. 1360, 1401 (D. Md. 1973), afl'd per curiam, 500 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1974) . 
... 370 F. Supp. 1101 (D.D.C. 1974). 
'17 W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 327 n.l1. 
,.. Danielson, supra note 215, at 699. 
'" For example, one of the revisions included an early type of emissions offset plan known 
as "Net Vehicle Miles Traveled Reduction." 38 Fed. Reg. 29,893 (1973). Under such plan, if 
a facility, in itself, would promote more efficient automobile activity, or if a compensating 
reduction in vehicle traffic could be achieved elsewhere in the Air Quality Maintenance Area, 
then construction could be authorized. Thus, a regional shopping center might qualify under 
the plan because people would not drive from store to store as they would in strip develop-
ments. This plan therefore erodes the impact of indirect source control regulations in the same 
manner as industrial emissions trade-offs erode stationary source regulation. See text at notes 
334-59, infra. The Vehicle Miles Traveled trade-off proposal was made in the original substi-
tute regulations, wherein EPA was to impose controls on the states. 38 Fed. Reg. 29,893 
(1973). The proposal was, however, dropped in the final substitute regulations. 39 Fed. Reg. 
7270 (1974). 
27' Alabama, Florida and Guam. See Danielson, supra note 215, at 706 n.66. This parallels 
the failure of states to submit adequate transportation plans. See text at note 238, supra. 
27' Danielson, supra note 215, at 714. See also 39 Fed. Reg. 7272 (1974). 
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Congress terminated all appropriations to EPA for the purpose of 
administering "any program to tax, limit, or otherwise regulate 
parking facilities"273 the Agency was forced to suspend review of 
indirect source controls.274 This termination was consistent with its 
action in the Energy Supply and Environmental Cooordination Act 
of 1974 which prevented EPA from requiring parking surcharge reg-
ulation as a part of a State Plan.275 Finally, in 1977, the Clean Air 
Amendments formally eliminated indirect source controls by ren-
dering such reviews strictly voluntary on the part of the states. 278 
E. Accomodating Industrial Growth: Current Approaches 
In drafting the 1970 Clean Air Act, Congress clearly foresaw that, 
to realize and maintain ambient air standards, it would not be 
sufficient merely to clean up existing industries; pollution control 
efforts would have to deal with new factories. To force industry to 
J adopt fundamental changes in production, Congress mandated 
standards for new facilities, called New Source Performance Stan-
dards (NSPS), which were more stringent than those for existing 
facilities.277 Congress also gave responsibility for NSPS enforcement 
directly to EPA, rather than to the states through the State Plan 
process, but this power could (and has been) delegated to the 
./ states.278 NSPS regulation, therefore, intersects with state powers of 
"pre-construction review"279 and is part of state planning to achieve 
and maintain ambient air standards. Thus, the State Plans and 
NSPS considered together provide a foundation for strict location 
and emissions control over new sources, as well as the opportunity 
for supplementary planning. 
. The planning process itself divides into two parts, depending on 
. the prevailing air quality: certain regulations control new sources 
locating in areas with air cleaner than primary standards, while 
others are applicable to those moving into areas with air worse than 
the standards. The former comes under the heading of "non-
273 See Danielson, supra note 215, at 714 (quoting Section 510 of H.R. 16901, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1975)). 
27. See 39 Fed. Reg. 45,014 (1974)(amending 40 C.F.R. § 52.22 (1974)). See also Danielson 
supra note 215, at 737 n.222. ' 
275 Pub. L. No. 93-319, § 4(b)(2)(B), 88 Stat. 257 (1974)(codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
5(c)(2)(B)(1976). 
27' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 108(e), 91 Stat. 695 (1977)(to 
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7410). 
277 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970). 
271 See note 38, supra. 
27. See text at note 207, supra. 
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degradation" policy and the latter falls under the rubric of air qual-
ity maintenance planning280 and emissions offsets. 
Growth control and land use planning with respect to industry 
were, therefore, within the scope of clean air regulation from the 
beginning.281 Yet, for several years these powers lay relatively dor-
mant, and land use planning efforts were confined to indirect source 
controls.282 Furthermore, EPA did not issue a significant number of 
NSPS up to 1976.283 Prior to 1975, the main issue with respect to 
industrial emissions was achieving compliance from existing sta-
tionary sources; concern with growth had not yet reached the fore-
front. The erosion of the Act up to this time consists of the absence 
of significant action by the regulators. Since 1975, however, the 
unavoidable conflict between industrial growth and air quality 
maintenance has precipitated a process of erosion of the Clean Air 
Act to accommodate growth. EPA and Congress have allowed in-
dustry (chiefly power plants) to move into previously pristine 
airsheds in rural areas by weakening the "non-degradation" pol-
icy.284 They also permitted industry to locate or expand in metropol-
itan areas which have not yet attained ambient air standards by 
instituting a new policy of emissions offsets285 and by pushing back 
attainment deadlines.28B This erosion of the Clean Air Act finally 
crystallized in the 1977 Amendments, which generally serve to legit-
imate the policy changes that EPA had gradually been putting into 
practice in its long process of accommodation.287 
1. New Source Performance Standards 
EPA has been very slow in promulgating New Source Perform-
ance Standards (NSPS) for new pollution sources. By the initial 
deadline in 1971, EPA had issued only five categories of standards, 
seven more were added in 1974 and twelve in 1976.288 Thus, the 
majority of new industrial plants have not been affected by NSPS, 
and some important polluters (petrochemical facilities, for exam-
ple) have yet to be regulated. Congress demonstrated its impatience 
2M. Regarding Air Quality Maintenance Plans, see text at notes 215-24, supra. 
'" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2)(B), (D)(1970). 
2M2 See text at notes 261-76, supra. 
'" See text at notes 288-90, infra. 
2" See text at notes 302-33, infra. 
2K5 See text at notes 334-54, infra. 
, .. See text at notes 162-68, supra. 
2M7 EPA finally issued more NSPS and was pushed farther by Congress; but the degree of 
erosion of the standards themselves is still moot. See text at notes 288-301, infra. 
2" See W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 268; 43 Fed. Reg. 42,186 (1978). 
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in the 1977 Amendments by ordering all remaining standards to be 
issued within four years. 2R9 The slowness in the promulgation of 
these standards is probably a major reason why NSPS have only 
recently become the focus of overt struggle over government pol-
icy.290 
Controversy over NSPS has been limited for additional reasons. 
First, many new sources have escaped regulation because either 
EPA has determined that certain modifications of existing plants 
have not been substantial enough to be classified as new sources, 291 
or because EPA has allowed modifications to be exempt from NSPS 
if other parts of the plant are closed so that net emissions levels are 
unchanged. 292 The latter actions by EPA amounted to an early form 
of emissions offsets policy.293 Second, the Clean Air Act requires 
\; economic and technological balancing with respect to new sources 
- a requirement not found elsewhere in the Act. Such a provision 
probably contributed to industry quiescence with respect to NSPS, 
because the balancing process produced standards less stringent 
than they otherwise would have been. Finally, the cost of pollution 
',' control is not as significant a factor in new plants as the cost of 
retrofitting is in old facilities. 294 
When industry challenged the first set of NSPS, issued in 1971, 
the court, in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus, 295 upheld 
the requirement for a "standard of performance" which reflects the 
"application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking 
into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator 
determines has been adequately demonstrated"296 and which would 
encourage development and force implementation of innovative 
technical approaches to solve pollution problems. Nonetheless, the 
court did agree that EPA should consider economic impacts as 
, .. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 109(a), 91 Stat. 697 (1977) (to 
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7411) . 
... Ct., e.g., 43 Fed. Reg. 4218 (1978). Furthermore, there is direct evidence which demon-
j strates that NSPS will be the next major source of conflict between industry and environmen-
talists. For example, on January 15, 1979, the California Council for Economic and Environ-
mental Balance, a major industrial lobbying group, held a conference in San Francisco explic-
itly to consider strategies for industry in dealing with the Clean Air Act. At this conference 
the NSPS were under intense attack from such prominent figures as William Ruckelshaus, 
former EPA Administrator. 
'" W. RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 273 . 
.. , [d . 
.. 3 Kramer, supra note 4, at 170 . 
... J. BOOTHE, CLEANING Up; THE COSTS OF REFINERY POLLUTION CONTROL 37,48 (1975). 
, .. 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973) . 
... 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a)(1)(1970). 
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we11.297 The court remanded the record to EPA for further proceed-
ings29H and EPA repromulgated the original standards299 which were 
then upheld in Portland Cement Association v. Train. 300 Even if the 
outcome of Portland Cement is seen as a victory for defenders of the 
Act, legal actions by industry hav·e definitely succeeded in delaying 
enforcement of the original NSPS until 1975 and also appear to have 
made EPA more cautious in formulating the standards.301 Yet, on 
the whole, it is too early to judge what the full impact of NSPS will 
be. Since the standards have only recently become a significant 
matter of controversy between industry and EPA, their part in the 
erosion of the Clean Air Act is still undetermined. 
2. Non-Degradation 
Non-degradation policy applies to geographic areas with air that 
is cleaner than required by secondary ambient air standards, but 
which are threatened with deterioration of their air quality because 
of the influx of industry and accompanying urbanization. The policy 
thus almost entirely involves rural areas - from the urban fringe 
of large cities to undeveloped reaches of the West covering approxi-
mately fifty to eighty percent of the country.302 Since the rate of 
industrial growth is presently the greatest in these rural areas,303 the v 
controversy over non-degradation is particularly acute. Indeed, 
many of the industries in question have moved into relatively 
"pristine" areas precisely in order to avoid clean air regulations 
which apply in highly polluted metropolitan centers.304 The most 
dramatic example of this phenomenon, and the one creating most 
of the non-degradation controversy, is the invasion of the Colorado 
Plateau region by coal-fired generating plants which chiefly serve 
Los Angeles. A strictly enforced non-degradation policy would end, 
or at least slow, industrial development throughout the country, 
'97 486 F.2d at 387-88. The court implicitly directed EPA to examine the proposed stan-
dards' effects on subdivisions of the current market. Kramer, supra note 4, at 205-06; W. 
RoDGERS, supra note 16, at 271. 
,., Portland Cement Assoc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
,.. 39 Fed. Reg. 39,872 (1974). 
,.. 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). 
30' See Kramer, supra note 4, at 209. 
30' Disselhorst, Sierra Club v. Ruchelshaus On A Clear Day . .. , 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 739, 740 
(1975). See also NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULES FOR 
PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT AIR QUALITY DETERIORATION 18 (June 20, 1973). 
303 See G. STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, POST-INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: METROPOLITAN DECLINE AND 
INTERREGIONAL JOBSHIFTS (1976). 
"" EPA and undeveloped states have strongly supported such a policy of dispersion of 
industry. Disselhorst, supra note 302, at 741 n.14. 
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since even a single powerplant in an area such as the Colorado 
Plateau dramatically lowers air quality.30s Industry could conceiv-
ably be told not only how and where to build, but whether it could 
build at all. 
The struggle over definition and implementation of a non-
degradation policy has demonstrated the inability or unwillingness 
of government regulators to grapple with an issue of this magni-
tude.308 The policy of non-degradation, also called "prevention of 
significant deterioration," originally emerged as an administrative 
interpretation by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(HEW)307 of the 1967 Air Quality Act's statement of Congressional 
intent "to protect and enhance the quality of the nation's air re-
sources"308 - language subsequently reenacted in the 1970 Clean 
Air Act.309 The legislative history of the 1970 Act suggests that Con-
gress intended a policy ofnon-degradation.3IO However, Congress did 
not explicitly provide for a program to prevent significant deteriora-
tion, and appears not to have comprehended the magnitude or com-
plexity of the task which such a policy presented to EPA . 
. j Originally EPA refused to follow the policy established by HEW 
in interpreting the non-degradation language. When EPA issued 
administrative guidelines in 1971, it ruled that the emissions limita-
tions contained in NSPS were sufficient to prevent significant dete-
rioration. However, EPA's position was untenable.311 Even Congress 
... Craig, Cloud on the Desert, 13 ENVIRONMENT 20 (1971) . 
... On the origins of non-degradation policy see Jorling, The Federal Law of Air Pollution 
Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1058, 1078-82 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974). 
317 HEW preceded EPA as the agency administering federal air regulation. EPA was 
created in 1970 and assumed HEW's duties with respect to air regulation. See Reorganization 
Plan No.3 of 1970, § 2(a)(3), 5 U.S.C. App. n (1976), 84 Stat. 2086, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970). 
30M Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). Why did HEW feel free to interpret the Act as 
requiring a non-degradation policy when broadening of regulatory power is uncharacteristic 
of federal agencies? The likely reason is that there was no legal or administrative machinery 
at the time capable of enforcing any federal ambient standards or non-degradation policy. 
Thus, the policy did not represent any threat. See, e.g., Hearings on Air Pollution Before the 
Senate Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 68-1533 (1970)(testimony on various proposed air quality amendments which 
contained enforcement provisions). 
300 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1)(1970). 
31. Kramer, supra note 4, at 222-23. 
311 NSPS do not account for the cumulative impact of new facilities. Mihaly, The Clean 
Air Act and The Concept of Non-Degradation: Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
801 (1972). Nor do they account for the overall impacts of industry-induced development, 
traffic, etc. NSPS are based on the best technology in current use, which still may allow 
considerable emissions relative to the purity of air in some areas. Finally, the NSPS do not 
cover all types of emissions and all industries, particularly given EPA's tardy promulgation 
of guidelines. See text at notes 288-90, supra. 
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recognized that the Act was threatened by such administrative in-
terpretations. 312 Congress conducted oversight hearings in an at-
tempt to force EPA to obey the law. The hearings revealed that the 
agency simply refused to implement the policy which had been 
created by its predecessor, affirmed by the legislative history of the 
1970 Act and understood by its officials during 1970-71; EPA had 
attempted unilaterally to rewrite the law. An ironic switch in roles 
ensued as Congress attempted to implement its own legislation in 
spite of administrative attempts to subvert it.3\3 
Finally, in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,314 the District Court for J 
the District of Columbia upheld the original HEW interpretation of 
the Act and prevented EPA from approving portions of any State 
Plan which allowed significant deterioration of air quality. The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling on the 
interpretation. 315 In 1973, following the Supreme Court's ruling, 
EPA proposed new non-degradation rules. However, even these new 
proposed rules exhibited EPA's reluctance to carry out the law. The 
preamble to the regulations states that the issue is so complex and 
its implications so profound that it "must be discussed, debated and 
decided as a public policy issue, with full consideration of its eco-
nomic and social implications."318 It argues that other tools of the 
Clean Air Act are sufficient to prevent deterioration below ambient 
air standards, stating that "it is not within the province of EPA. . . 
to impose limitations on the Nation's growth," and that "[t]o es-
tablish a policy that new emissions can only be introduced to the 
extent that current emissions are reduced would forever relegate 
these [clean air] areas to an essentially undeveloped status."317 The 
Agency preamble appears to be a statement to Congress that EPA 
neither understood nor desired the consequences of a non-
degradation policy. In fact, EPA thereby created political momen-
tum for elimination of the policy by statute. 
Ultimately, in order to carry out its non-degradation mandate, ~. 
EPA developed an Area Classification System in 1974.318 This plan 
312 Mihaly, supra note 311, at 819-22. 
313 Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the 
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Public Works Comm., 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 14-15 (1972)(comments of Senator Eagleton). For EPA's position see 40 C.F.R. §§ 
50.2(c), 51.l2(b) (1972). 
3,. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D. D.C. 1972). 
ll5 Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973). 
'" 38 Fed. Reg. 18,986 (1973). 
317 Id. at 18,987-88. 
31M 39 Fed. Reg. 31,000 (1974). On the evolution of the final plan see Disselhorst, supra note 
302. 
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categorized areas into three possible land designations. All areas are 
initially deemed to be Class II, which would allow a moderate degree 
of deterioration of existing air quality and a "reasonable amount" 
of industry, sufficiently dispersed.318 Lands may then be designated 
upward to Class I, in order to protect areas of exceptional scenic, 
recreational or ecological value, or downward to Class III, in which 
deterioration could proceed down to the level of the secondary stan-
dards. EPA stated that redesignation to Class III should take place 
in areas "intended to experience rapid and major industrial or com-
mercial expansion . . . . "320 In other words, by segmenting clean 
air areas into various classes, EPA was able to soften the non-
degradation policy for all but the most select areas and to abandon 
it altogether in the case of Class III lands.321 
'J In Sierra Club v. EPA,322 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia upheld this new policy against the attacks 
of environmentalists. In the 1977 Clean Air Amendments, Congress 
enacted EPA's policy into law, although with some slight modifica-
tions.323 Congress improved EPA's policy by automatically designat-
ing all large national parks and wilderness areas as Class Ilands;324 
expanding the number of types of sources which must undergo pre-
construction review from nineteen to all major facilities;325 requiring 
"best available control technology" for all types of pollutants;326 and 
opening all permit applications to public hearings.327 However, not 
all of Congress' actions were improvements. First, the notorious 
Breaux Amendment, offered in the interests of the proposed Inter-
mountain Power Project in Utah, allows a governor to request a 
variance from Class I standards for up to eighteen days a year. 328 
31. 39 Fed. Reg. 31,004 (1974). 
3211 Id. 
:021 Critics of EPA's position were also concerned with several specific elements: (1) the 
critical "baseline" year from which deterioration is measured was moved back from 1972 to 
1974, allowing prior sources to escape review and lowering baseline air quality that much 
more; (2) only two pollutants, SO, and particulates, were subject to review; (3) new sources 
were required only to adopt "best available control technology" (BACT), a standard involving 
substantial economic and technical balancing. The BACT had, however, to be better than 
the relevant NSPS, where one exists; (4) only major sources, of 100 tons annual emissions, 
were to be reviewed; (5) the permit process was closed to all but written comments from the 
public. See Kramer, supra note 4, 228-29. 
m 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
m Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470 et seq.). 
:rZ4 Id. § 127,91 Stat. 731 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7472). 
:oil Id., 91 Stat. 735 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7475). 
3Zt Id., 91 Stat. 736. 
mId., 91 Stat. 736-37. 
:1211 Id., 91 Stat. 737-38. 
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Such a variance could cause "substantial deterioration" of pristine 
areas, according to Senator Gary Hart. 329 Second, a federal land 
manager can ask the state to permit construction of a plant in a 
Class I area if, in his judgment, it will not have an adverse effect 
on air quality.330 Third, the legislation seems to have created the 
general belief that Class I designation is limited solely to federal 
recreation lands, and then not necessarily to all such lands. Fourth, 
the tougher Congressional provisions, except for the automatic des-
ignation of certain areas as Class I lands, do not pre-empt existing 
EPA regulations until such time as the states revise their State 
Plans in light of the new regulations.331 And, perhaps most impor-
tantly, since the standard from which deterioration is measured is 
defined as existing air quality at the time a permit application is 
filed,332 the standard will necessarily be lowered over time since each 
new source will reduce air quality somewhat, and the next permit 
applicant consequently will have a lower standard to meet. 
In any event, the new non-degradation policy continues the tradi- ,/ 
tional American practice of land management: protect certain select 
areas called "parks" and leave the rest to commercial use and 
abuse. 333 If industry did not get exactly what it wanted in this fight, 
it did gain the crucial enclaves necessary to new urban-industrial 
growth in the form of Class III lands. In the process, government v-
once again abdicated any positive land use planning, adopting a 
defensive position around its Class I parks and limiting its expecta-
tions to the attainment of secondary standards in Class II and III 
areas. 
3. Non-Attainment and Air Trade-Offs 
The new air trade-offs policy, adopted by EPA in 1976334 and 
ratified by Congress in 1977,335 poses most clearly the question of 
whether the Clean Air Act can triumph in a confrontation with 
urban-industrial growth. The regulators seem to believe that it can-
not. The practical issue facing government is how to accommodate J 
321 Congressional Quarterly, Aug. 6, 1977, at 1631. 
330 Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127,91 Stat. 736-37 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7475). 
331 Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 127, 91 Stat. 740 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7478). 
332 [d .• 91 Stat. 741 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7479). 
333 See generally R. Walker. The Suburban Solution (1977). unpublished Ph.D. Disserta-
tion, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University (available from University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, 
Michigan and at Johns Hopkins University library). 
334 See 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976); San Francisco Chroncile, Dec. 21, 1976. at 6, col. 2. 
335 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 748 
(1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7503). 
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industrial growth in air quality regions that have not attained pri-
mary air standards, which means all big metropolitan areas except 
Honolulu.338 Emissions offsets were devised as a strategy to reconcile 
the conflicting demands of industrial growth and clean air stan-
dards. The basic idea behind the policy is as follows: a new facility 
,j can locate or an existing plant can be expanded in a non-attainment 
area only if (1) the new source meets the "lowest achievable emis-
sion rate" (which must, in any case, be less than the applicable 
NSPS for that industry); (2) a reduction of allowable emissions by 
existing sources is secured so that there is a net reduction in total 
emissions in the area, and this reduction constitutes "reasonable 
progress" toward the 1982 attainment deadline; and (3) all other 
facilities of the company in the state are in compliance or on sched-
ule under the State Plan.337 Although this policy appears reasonable 
on its face, an understanding .of the steps by which it came into 
being and of the weakness of the law as written reveals that the air 
trade-offs policy is in fact a step backward in enforcement of the 
Clean Air Act - a tactical retreat by the states, EPA and Congress. 
oJ Read literally, the Clean Air Act would appear virtually to pro-
hibit any new sources until air quality standards were met.338 The 
Act provides that every State Plan have rules for pre-construction 
review of new stationary sources to assure that they do not conflict 
with efforts to achieve primary ambient air standards.33s Pre-
construction (or "new source") review subsequently became part of 
EPA's Air Quality Maintenance Plan (AQMP) enforcement pro-
gram.340 Nonetheless, EPA did not issue guidelines for new source 
review until 1976.341 During this time, new industrial growth contin-
ued to exacerbate the pollution problem in metropolitan areas. 
... See text at note 45, supra. 
337 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 748 
(1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7503) . 
... The 1970 Senate Report on the Clean Air Act seems to have anticipated exactly this 
sort of prohibition when it said that the State Plan must have a review process to: 
insure that any existing or future stationary source of air pollution will be located, de-
signed, constructed, equipped, and operated. . . so as not to interfere with the implemen-
tation, maintenance, and enforcement of any applicable air quality standard or goal. . . . 
In air quality regions where present air quality is below the standard, rigorous restrictions 
must be placed on existing sources to provide a margin for future growth, or only pollution 
free growth, development and expansion will be possible. 
S. Rl!:P. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970). 
... See text at notes 206-07, supra. 
... See text at notes 215-24, supra. 
UI 41 Fed. Reg. 55,528 (1976)(interpretive ruling for implementation of the requirements 
of 40 C.F.R. § 51.18). 
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The matter climaxed when industry sought to locate two large 
and controversial facilities in polluted air basins in California: Dow 
Chemical Company's proposed petrochemical complex in Solano 
County near San Francisco and Standard of Ohio's (SOHIO) pro-
posed oil terminal and pipeline in Long Beach.342 The Bay Area Air 
Pollution Control District triggered statewide controversy when it 
refused to grant a permit to Dow.343 Although SOHIO's permit ap-
plication had not been formally rejected, its chances for approval 
were obviously slim. In response to the uproar of business opposition 
to these principled stands, however, the regulations began to be 
100sened.344 
The California Air Resources Board initiated the retreat by 
adopting new source review rules for the Southern California Air 
Pollution Control District which embodied the trade-off idea in 
order specifically to accommodate SOHIO.345 EPA subsequently is-
sued an "interpretive ruling" which made trade-offs national pol-
icy.34ft Then, after Dow withdrew its permit request, a California 
Assembly member introduced a bill to make trade-offs state pol-
icy.347 Trade-offs subsequently became federal law with passage of 
the 1977 Amendments.348 
While this national trade-offs policy is considerably more restric-
tive than that first embodied in the California Air Resources 
Board's rule, it also remains dangerously vague on several critical 
issues involving the implementation of emissions offsets.348 First, vi 
Congress does not specify the ratio of existing pollution which may 
be traded for pollution from new industry; yet, if the ratio is not 
significantly greater than one-to-one, the trade-off will make no 
progress toward meeting standards. Congress only asks that "rea-
sonable further progress" be made toward reaching the 1982 
goal,350 a vague mandate that is representative of the weak pre-
scriptions which the firm deadlines of the 1970 Act sought to 
342 For a history and discussion of air trade-offs in California see Alfandary, Air Trade-Offs: 
Attempting to Reconcile Industrial Growth and Clean Air in California, 18 PUB. AFF. REP. 1-
7 (1978) . 
... Walker, Storper & Gersh, The Limits of Environmental Control: The Saga of Dow in 
the Delta, to be published in 11 ANTIPODE (1979) . 
... Id . 
... California Air Resources Bd., Rule 213(3). Resolution #79-39, Oct. 8, 1976. 
341 See 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976); San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 21, 1976, at 6, col. 2. 
347 AB 471, introduced Feb. 10, 1977, amended April 26, 1977 and Aug. 5, 1977 . 
... Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 748 
(1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7503). 
'" See Alfandary, supra note 342, at 5 . 
... Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 748 (1977) 
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7503(I)(A». 
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.j overcome. Second, Congress is silent with respect to the size of 
regions within which trade-offs may be made. It is possible that 
sources far apart can substitute for one another, regardless of the 
real impact on the population in the area. Under such loose re-
strictions new industries may search out the most readily abated 
sources of pollution, regardless of how they relate to the problem 
posed by the new facility, leaving the most difficult and expensive 
pollution problems to be solved under State Plans. EPA is aware 
of this problem, but has merely asked states to use a "reasonable 
cutoff on the geographic content of the air quality calculations."351 
-' Third, EPA limited new source review to only those sources emit-
ting more than 100 tons of pollutants a year.352 The limitation 
allows many significant polluters to escape review and is especially 
worrisome in the instance of "staged" construction of large facili-
ties such as petrochemical plants, wherein the complete facility 
may emit more than 100 tons, but no single individual stage would 
emit 100 tons; if each "stage" is the relevant unit, the facility 
could escape new source review. Fourth, Congress based the 
trade-off potential of existing facilities on their allowable, rather 
- than their actual, emissions. 353 Since some facilities are not pollut-
ing up the maximum limits allowed by law, they may either trade-
off "paper pollution" or deliberately increase their emissions in 
order to have more pollution to trade-off in the future. With the 
poor record of enforcement of existing State Plans, it is likely that 
there will be an even greater future divergence between Plans and 
reality under this policy. Finally, neither Congress nor EPA de-
manded that the old source be shut down before construction of the 
new one begins. Thus, once the new facility is in place, industry can 
balk at compliance for years. The dispute between the Bay Area Air 
Pollution Control District and Standard Oil of California's Rich-
mond refinery may be an omen; Standard Oil reneged on an agree-
ment to shut down two older units while at the same time it began 
operating a new one. 354 
Unless stringent conditions are set for emissions offsets and unless 
such conditions are met in practice, the new air trade-offs policy will 
mean that primary air standards will never be met in the face of 
continued urban-industrial growth. 
'51 41 Fed. Reg. 55,526 (1976). 
35' [d. at 55,558. 
30' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 745, 748 
(1977)(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A)). 
'54 See San Francisco Examiner, May 15, 1977, at 1; San Francisco Chronciie, ,July 8, 
] 978, at 2, col. 1. 
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F. Summation: Stages of Erosion 
The preceding review of the erosion of the Clean Air Act is famil-
iar to those who have watched the progress of the law over time, 
although some of the matters described are subject to interpretation 
regarding their impact on the Act's successful implementation and 
the realization of clean air in the long run. This article adopts a 
pessimistic view toward the ultimate effectiveness of the Act. Only 
time will vindicate or reprove this view. However, the legacy of past 
failures, which began before 1970,355 leaves little confidence in the 
future attainment of the 1970 Act's goals. 
The chronology of the Act's rise and fall divides into stages, sepa-
rated by the major legislative interventions of Congress. From 1963 
to 1970, timid actions by Congress could not placate the growing 
concern over worsening air quality and public exasperation with the 
futility of weak legislation. The 1970 Clean Air Act resulted. 
The 1970 Act marked a new stage of development. EPA, environ-
mentalists and industry were all involved in the great experiment. 
Although erosion of the Act began immediately, it did nQt become 
decisive unti11973-74 when major crises struck energy supplies, the 
automobile industry and the economy in genera1.358 Congress re-
acted with the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act 
of 1974, which formalized EPA's delaying actions, further delayed 
auto emission deadlines, virtually ended EPA's efforts to institute 
transportation controls and initiated a coal-based energy policy 
which runs directly against the interests of clean air. As the original 
target year of 1975 passed, the Act's goals had been deemed unreal-
istic and unenforceable, and most of its deadlines were waived. 
After a brief respite, pressure against the Act began building once 
·again. The pressure came from several quarters: the new deadlines 
were approaching, the continuing recession placed economic bur-
dens on major polluting industries such as electric utilities and 
steel, certain industries sought to locate in new areas such as the 
Colorado Plateau, industry launched a new wave of investment in 
plants in metropolitan areas and corporations, labor and others de-
veloped a fear of "no-growth" policies which evolved at a time of 
economic stagnation.357 The predictable result was that in 1976-77, 
Congress once again amended the Clean Air Act . 
... See J. ESPOSITO, supra note 6. 
,.. See Walker & Large, supra note 227. 
35' For a discussion of these forces see text at notes 368-417, infra. See also Walker, Storper 
& Gersh, supra note 343. 
v' 
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The new Amendments released the growing political and eco-
nomic pressure against compliance measures by such means as the 
delay of auto emission deadlines, the policy of allowing significant 
deterioration of air quality in certain geographic areas, the use of 
emissions offsets which allowed growth in non-attainment areas and 
the delay of State Plan deadlines which legitimized non-attainment 
of standards and non-compliance with the Plans. Senator Edmund 
Muskie summarized the erosion of the Clean Air Act by the 1977 
Amendments in these terms: 
All in all, Mr. President, this bill represents something less than that 
which we set out to do in 1970. Under this legislation, the Administrator 
of the Environmental Protection Agency will have fewer tools to accom-
plish the job of protecting America's health and welfare from the threat 
of air pollution .... So, Mr. President, we begin again.358 
The enactment of the 1977 Amendments commences yet another 
stage in the evolution of the Clean Air Act. It is likely that pressure 
will again mount for a relaxation of standards and deadlines as the 
general revised target date of 1982 approaches; suits will be filed, 
EPA will take various actions, states will respond and, in all proba-
bility, Congress will have to re-enter the arena to clarify de facto 
policies. 
This is not to say that all the goals and means for attaining such 
goals in the 1970 Act have been abandoned or that progress in clean-
ing the air may not actually continue to be made. But if past experi-
ence is any guide, promises of future compliance - of making 
"reasonable progress" toward clean air - are not very reassuring. 
In fact, the preceding examination of the Act's history indicates that 
the pressures to restrict enforcement of the Act are deeply rooted in 
the basic political and economic relationships of our society. In the 
next three sections this article will examine some of these relation-
ships in order to describe the systematic forces arrayed against 
cleaning up the air. 
IV. THE RoLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE FAILURE OF REGULATION 
Although the preceding discussion documents the systematic ero-
sion of the Clean Air Act, it does not explain why that erosion 
occurred. By attending too closely to the "law" as such, one will deal 
only with formal results and apparent causes. The form of the law 
directs one's attention to the stated ideas and logical reasoning of 
35' 123 CONGo BEe. 813,696-97 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977)(remarks of 8en. Muskie). 
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decision-makers in the various branches of government. Thus, most 
critics of the erosion of the Clean Air Act ascribe the failure of "law" 
to a failure of judicial logic or administrative willpower.358 However, 
this kind of reasoning forcibly extracts individuals, ideas, the legal 
system and government as a whole from their real social context in 
an unsupportable manner.380 In order to ferret out the underlying. 
causes of social outcomes, one must address the material forces of· 
political and economic life which impinge upon the formal, legal 
decisions of government agents. This is not to say that ideas and 
wills do not enter into the process, but rather that they are ideas 
and wills of real people, in and out of government, who are grounded 
in real class positions, real social roles and a real economic system 
with its own distinct requirements for successful reproduction.381 
Considerations of self-interest, expertise, personal judgment and 
legal consistency all playa part, but always with respect to the 
restraints inherent in the functioning of the larger social structure. 
Government is neither independent from society, nor is it a neu-
tral arbiter in social conflict. Its institutions, personnel and policies 
are all arenas of social struggle. Indeed, governments only come into 
being through an historical process of political conflict over what 
needs doing and how it should be done.382 Any specific effort to 
control social life and the economy which government undertakes, 
be it through the regulatory process, the consideration of a bill in 
Congress or the institution of enforcement proceedings against vio-
lators, necessarily contains ongoing conflict over means and ends.383 
The personnel of regulatory agencies act under varying degrees of 
influence from two general types of political forces: (1) external" 
pressures exerted on them directly by lobbying, threats and prom-
ises by the powerful, legal suits, mass political protest, voting and 
so forth; and (2) internal forces, generated within each person by , 
his/her own judgment regarding the meaning of laws, by his/her own 
beliefs as to what is right and proper or by his/her own understand-
311 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4. 
311 On the material structural analysis of society, see D. HARVEY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CITY (1973). 
-IOn the relation of individual ideas and will to society and its roles, see R. WILLIAMS, 
MARxISM AND LITERATURE (1978); R. BERNSTEIN, THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOCIAL AND POIJTlCAL 
THEoRY (1976); R. PARK, THE IoEAOF SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1974); D. HARVEY, supra note 360. 
_z See generally Esping-Anderson, Friedland & Wright, Modes of Class Struggle and the 
Capitalist State, KAPITAlJSTATE 186 (Summer 1976) . 
.. On the idea of government policy as process see W. DOMHon, WHO REALLy GOVERNS 
(1976); J.L. DAVIES & B. DAVIES, supra note 6; P. BACHRACH & M. BARATZ, POWER AND POVERTY 
(1970). 
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ing as to what it is possible to do under prevailing social conditions. 
"Internalized" forces are, of course, not random, but are condi-
tioned by several external social mechanisms: by a pervasive ideol-
ogy which provides a definite view of how the world works and how 
it ought to work, by a previously established system of law, by the 
threat of external intervention if the wrong action is taken and by 
an operating economic system which gives clear signals of distress 
when government pushes too hard. The preceding arguments serve 
to break down the practical distinction between abstract "policy" 
and actual "implementation" when agencies must choose how to 
interpret the broad rules handed down to them, when the courts, the 
President's office and states react and interact with agency actions 
and, finally, when Congress reconsiders its proclamations in light of 
actual implementation efforts. Similarly, clean lines between 
"government" and "the private sector" do not exist, not only be-
cause government personnel-particularly the leadership364 - move 
freely back and forth between public and private life, but also be-
cause the general "pressures and limits"365 of social and economic 
reproduction impinge on government and citizenry alike. 
Moreover, constant reconsideration of regulatory measures is ne-
cessitated not only by changing economic and political circumstan-
ces, but also because sectors of society rarely know unambiguously 
what their interests are, or what is possible within the realm of 
political change. Hence, government policies, especially reform ef-
forts such as the Clean Air Act, are very much experiments in lim-
ited change. Such experiments are undertaken in a highly politi-
cized setting where outlines of political power, economic impera-
tives and ideological motivation are already established. The virtue 
of the Clean Air Act as a case study in regulatory experiment and 
• failure is that it provides a good step-by-step history of the disman-
tling of initial goals which turned out to be "unrealistic" in terms 
of the subsequent impacts they actually had, or threatened to pro-
duce, on the economy.388 
The relatively loose structure of the representative and federal 
forms of government are quite useful for societal adaptability and 
.. , W. DOMHOFF, THE POWERS THAT BE (1978); R. MllJBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 
(1969). 
... The phrase is from Williams, supra note 36, at 87 . 
... In this case the law has not stood in isolation from reality owing to tacit non-enforcement 
as is often the case. It has, instead, had to be openly modified over time in light of efforts to 
enforce it. This outcome owes much to the constant prodding of the government by environ-
mentalists armed with the right to sue for non-action - one of the many progressive features 
of the Act itself. See text at note 29, supra. 
1978] CLEAN AIR ACT 243 
long-term stability because it provides a degree of access to power 
by various interests and a way to experiment with social change.387 
Nonetheless, it cannot guarantee that such experiments will suc-
ceed. The Clean Air Act had to be modified because government v 
could not resolve harmoniously the conflicting demands of clean air 
goals and economic growth, energy independence, suburb ani zed 
city structures and other interests. In the course of searching for 
ways to attain statutory air pollution goals, the government moved 
from the realm of formal law to substantive economic questions. 
What began as a supposedly simple effort to abate air pollution 
threatened to draw government into the establishment of substan-
tial controls over such a wide range of economic activity as urbani-
zation, industrial investment, energy use and land use. Hence a 
single-purpose act threatened to become a wide-ranging program of 
national economic planning, and began to affect a wide range of 
variables in the private sector. When economic disruption or the 
prerogatives of the private sector are imminently threatened, how-
ever, an ostensibly open, loosely organized and "pluralistic" govern-
ment can react decisively to limit change, whether by restraints 
imposed on one branch of government by another, or by restraints 
imposed by higher levels of bureaucracy on lower levels. If, on the 
other hand, government cannot internally set its own limits, power-
ful outside forces will act upon the government to restrict change. 
The following section analyzes in greater detail the central 
"structural" imperatives of the political economy which forced the 
government to retreat from the regulatory goals it established in the 
Clean Air Act of 1970. 
v. POLmCAL-EcONOMIC BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT 
The discussion of the legal erosion of the Clean Air Act demon-
strates the existence of a group of political-economic barriers to the 
government's implementation of the Act as written. These barriers 
make it, in effect, impossible simply to legislate clean air . 
.. 7 This openness is strongly favored where the dominant class is relatively competitive and 
regionally dispersed, and where the economic system is highly dynamic and must continually 
innovate to overcome barriers to accumulation, as is the case in American capitalism. A 
degree of openness can even help to preserve class domination, since some demands from 
below can be met without jeopardizing upper class prerogatives and power. In strictly class 
terms, however, American government is considerably less open to influence than popular 
ideology would have us believe. See note 364, supra. 
.J 
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A. Industry Resistance 
The most obvious impression presented by the legal history of the 
Clean Air Act is the continual exercise of power by business and 
industry to resist reforms. In carrying out a program of resistance, 
business utilizes its considerable economic resources, transforming 
them into direct political power through interminable lawsuits, 
lobbying efforts and threats to stop production, relocate or lay-off 
workers. 
Such resistance activities rest partially on complex economic 
bases, but no strictly "economic" explanation of business behavior 
is sufficient; exercise of individual and organizational "will" are also 
elements of business behavior. 388 Even when decisions are made 
regarding what seem to be strictly economic matters, responses are 
not necessarily predictable. For instance, since the rate of profit is 
never strictly determinate, business must weigh the probable costs 
of pollution control against the probable costs of resisting control 
and the probable results of such resistance before deciding on a 
J particular course of action. Hence a certain amount of the opposi-
tion to clean air regulation has resulted from a conscious obstruc-
tionist policy by corporations to avoid the costs of cleaning up the 
air, the resultant cuts in profits and the changes in process and 
product which would be required. 38D Waging massive public rela-
tions campaigns, initiating lawsuits and exercising political power 
are perceived to be better than compliance with the law. Whether 
or not business makes the decision which is economically "correct" 
for its own interests, it has options besides compliance with controls, 
and can exercise these options to their full advantage. 37o 
On the other hand, business personnel and corporations are also 
driven, conditioned or limited by economic forces beyond their indi-
vidual control; they undertake many actions which are less volun-
tary than they first appear.371 Yet, even when its options are limited 
by economic exigency, business may, by virtue of its power, still be 
"" Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management versus Stockholders, 41 HARV. Bus. REv. 116-
23(1963); J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). 
, .. See, e.g., Greer, supra note 147 (both references) on the corporate arrogance of U.S. 
Steel. 
370 Behind the exercise of "will" of course, lies the power born of economic valuables such 
as class position, corporate entities, etc. A good study of the exercise of class power, directly 
and indirectly, which criticizes the prevailing pluralist view in W. DOMHOFF, WHO REALLY 
GOVERNS (1976), a critique of R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS (1961). 
'71 For example, U.S. Steel can do nothing to reverse the recent stagnation of the markets 
for steel. Sweezy & Magdoff, Steel and Stagnation, 29 MONTHLY REv. 1 (1977). 
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able to marshall economic and political forces to its advantage. For 
example, although a corporation may be threatened with bank-
ruptcy if ordered to comply with regulations, it may salvage the 
situation by the judicious use of threats to close or relocate which 
mobilize public sentiment against the enforcement of regulations or 
succeed in forcing the government to subsidize the costs of cleaning 
up, as in the case of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel.372 
B. Threat of Dislocation of Particular Industries 
Vigorous enforcement of the Act threatens the profits, and hence 
the viability, of certain industries. Since the closing of a plant due v 
to such enforcement affects not only the owners and managers of the 
industries in question, but also the workers and their communities, 
a strong coalition against enforcement is thus formed. 373 Moreover, 
if the industries are as critical to the national economy as are the . 
automobile, steel and electric utility industries, any serious disloca-
tion of production and profits cannot be tolerated. In fact, these 
three industries have been in the forefront of opposition to the im-
plementation of the Clean Air Act and have had remarkable success 
in their efforts.374 They have won successive delays in implementa-
tion deadlines,375 have obtained weakened standards378 and have re-
ceived special regional dispensations.377 Even when they have ulti-
mately lost their fights against the Act,378 these industries have 
managed to delay implementation for years and to waste the time 
and resources of their opponents. 
C. Regional Dislocation and Competition for Investment 
Because many declining industries and marginal factories are 
312 See text at note 161, supra. 
313 On this phenomenon see Greer, supra note 147 (both references); Mumy, Law, Private "I 
Property and the Environment, 4 MD. L. FORUM 69 (1974). 
31. The three "problem" industries for the clean air campaign are all critical to the national 
economic health, are all mature, declining industries, and have suffered economic setbacks 
in the 1970's, owing to sagging markets, fuel price increases and foreign competition, among 
other things. On the problem of the steel industry see Sweezy & Magdoff, Steel and 
Stagnation, 29 MONTHLY REv. 1 (1977); on the automobile industry, see E. RoTHSCHILD, 
PARADISE LoST: THE DECIJNE OF THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE (1973). The utilities are in a rela-
tively more favorable position, but future growth through use of nuclear power is encountering 
increasing difficulties. Vinocur, Nuclear Business Fizzles, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 23, 
1977, at 30, col. 4; Pector, The Nuclear Power Industry and the Anti-Nuclear Movement, 8 
SOCIALIST REv. 9 (1978). 
S1I See text at notes 162-68 and 171-94, supra. 
311 See text at notes 318-21, supra. 
S17 See text at notes 106-07, supra. 
378 For example, in the tall stack controversy, see text at notes 136-42, supra. 
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concentrated in certain regions, these regions are currently suffering 
from generally unhealthy economies.379 A dramatic example is the 
so-called "decline of the northeast" (or "snowbelt"), marked by 
persistent high unemployment, local government fiscal crises, 
urban decay and generally poor economic growth.380 In such situa-
" tions the enforcers of the Clean Air Act again face a dilemma not of 
their own making, in which they have the power to tip the scales 
against a community or region. Naturally, there is intense local 
resistance to further dislocation. Recently the Carter Administra-
tion declared a national policy of aid to distressed areas;381 as a 
result, EPA has relaxed its strict enforcement of clean air standards 
in such problem areas as the old steel-producing region of the north-
east382 and has retreated from its transportation planning in such 
areas as the troubled New York metropolitan region.383 
The government has failed to impose strict enforcement on Los 
Angeles, too, even though it is part of the growing sunbelt region. 
Drastic restrictions, such as EPA's gas rationing scheme,384 could 
easily tip regional favorability away from Los Angeles. In fact, all 
regions compete for capital investment which overzealous pollution 
control may discourage, so there is a strong incentive among local 
and state governments to lower their environmental standards, not 
to mention taxes and other regulations.385 This was clearly demon-
strated by recent events in California, where renewed enforcement 
of air pollution regulations gave the state a sudden reputation for a 
"bad-business climate. "388 
D. Fixed Character of Urban and Regional Patterns 
Spatial patterns have considerable impact on the amount of pol-
m On the relationship between obsolescent industrial base and regional economic decline 
see Watkins & Perry, Regional Change and the Impact of Uneven Urban Development, in 
THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT C1T1ES 19 (D. Perry & A. Watkins eds. 1977). 
3M See THE FiSCAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CITIES (R. Alcaly & D. Mermelstein, eds. 1977); G. 
STERNLIEB & J. HUGHES, supra note 303. 
301 Address by President Jimmy Carter, "New Partnership to Conserve America's Com-
munities," Statement on National Urban Policy, at the White House (March 21, 1978). See 
also, "Toward Cities and People in Distress," a draft of the National Urban Policy Statement 
submitted by the President's Urban and Regional Policy Group (Nov. 15, 1977). 
302 See text at notes 154-61, supra. 
3113 See text at notes 250-55, supra. 
30. See text at notes 242-44, supra. 
3M For a good example of what can happen in this regard see Chernow, The Rabbit that 
Ate Pennsylvania, MOTHER JONES 19 (Jan. 1978). See also Harrison & Kanter, The Political 
Economy of State "Job-Creation" Business Incentives, in REVITALIZING THE NORTHEAST (G. 
Sternlieb & J. Hughes eds. 1978). 
3M See Walker, Storper & Gersh, supra note 343. 
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lution generated, especially by automobiles and other means of 
transport; existing space-extensive patterns of urbanization are not 
conducive to clean air and may have to be restructured in the inter-
ests of public health.387 However, EPA's rather feeble efforts to effect 
such changes have met with severe local opposition and were rather 
quickly abandoned.388 This failure is not a simple result of the im-
mutability of urban spatial patterns, although, because the organi-
zational structure of the city is literally frozen into stone and steel 
as factories, highways and cities,389 change can be very costly and 
socially disruptive. Rather, certain features of the political economy _. 
of American society systematically militate against such change. 
First, urban spatial patterns have arisen historically for rather deep-
seated reasons deriving from the nature and evolution of the United 
States.390 Regardless of the historical reasons for existing patterns, 
attempts to alter the present organization of the cities conflict with 
deeply ingrained interests and expectations of many elements of 
society. Second, change is opposed because it threatens profits, 
wages and individual income flowing from the existing set of urban 
activities; moreover, such costs are not borne evenly or without 
economic disruption. 391 Hence, the straightforward-if diffi-
cult-problem of restructuring the organization of urban space in 
the interests of public health is easily perceived as a "trade-off' 
between clean air on the one side and jobs, higher prices, dislocation 
and disruption on the other.392 
E. Threat of Halting New Growth 
Critics of the Clean Air Act have accused its enforcers of stopping ..; 
new growth, whether it be growth around major urban areas which 
already have a serious air pollution problem393 or growth in pre-
317 See, e.g., B. BERRY et al., LAND USE, URBAN FORM AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974); 
Kurtzweg, Urban Planning and Air Pollution Control, 39 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERS 82 (1973). _. 
3M See text at notes 228-76, supra. 
31. Harvey, The Geography of Accumulation, in RADICAL GEOGRAPHY 263 (R. Peet ed. 1977). 
310 See R. Walker, The Suburban Solution (1977), unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Balti-
more, Johns Hopkins University (available from University Microfilm, Ann Arbor, Michigan 
and Johns Hopkins University library). See also Walker, The Transformation of Urban Struc-
ture in Mid-Nineteenth Century American Cities and .the Beginnings of Sub urbanization, in 
URBANIZATION AND CONFLICT IN MARKET SOCIETIES (K. Cox ed. 1978); Gordon, Class Struggle 
and the States of American Urban Development in RISE OF THE SUNBELT CITIES 55 (D. Perry 
& A. Watkins eds. 1977); Watkins & Perry, Regional Change and the Impact of Uneven Urban 
Development, in THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT CITIES 19 (D. Perry & A. Watkins eds. 1977) . 
• 11 Mumy, supra note 373 and Mumy, Economic Systems and Environmental Quality, to 
be published in 11 ANTiPODE (1979). 
312Id. 
H. See text at notes 334-54, supra. 
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viously undeveloped, "pristine" areas.394 Indeed, literal enforcement 
of the Act would preclude industrial, transport or residential devel-
opment in cities which have not met primary ambient air standards, 
while strict accordance with the principle of "no significant deterio-
ration" would bar industry from moving to as yet unpolluted re-
gions. 
New growth would be less threatened if ambient air standards 
had already been met for urban areas and if all new pollution 
sources complied with emissions limitations. Yet, the economy 
rushes ahead whether or not these goals are achieved, with intense 
pressure being exerted from all quarters to accommodate such 
growth. Business wants its freedom to expand, promising such bene-
fits as jobs, tax revenues, real estate development and commercial 
growth.3' s The promise of such benefits generates political support 
for business objectives from nonbusiness interests: workers want 
jobs, small businesses want increased local commercial activity and 
governments want more tax revenues. 388 Yet, the erosion of the 1970 
Act cannot be understood as simply a response to growth; the spe-
cific character of that growth is important. In the latest wave of 
investment since the contraction of 1974-75, many industries have 
shifted to new production techniques and new locations. For exam-
ple, industry is adopting more energy-intensive production methods 
and is relocating facilities to suburban and rural areas.3U7 Naturally, 
any barriers to these growth trends would meet with stiff industry 
opposition. 
Several of the "compromises" in the Clean Air Act, initiated by 
EPA and translated into law with the Amendments of 1977, are 
meant to facilitate these growth trends.3us Nonetheless, such com-
j promises cannot resolve the underlying dilemma: if clean air cannot 
be achieved without growth, how can it be achieved with growth? 
Indeed, the compromises pose an even more discouraging question: 
•• See text at notes 302-33, supra. 
m The empirical tendency for capitalist enterprises to expand is obvious, and the impera-
tives to grow are also clear: the company that does not expand is likely to lose out to its 
competitors, to disgruntle its stockholders, to find its bond rating drop, to offer fewer oppor-
tunities for advancement to its managers, and so forth. All but the first hold true even for 
so-called "monopolies" such as public utilities; and even there, the threat of losing territory 
to competitors is great. 
III See Walker, Storper & Gersh, supra note 343 and Chernow, supra note 384. 
m Massey & Heegan, Industrial Restructuring versus the Cities, 15 URBAN STUDIES 273 
(1978); B. COMMONER, THE POVERTY or POWER (1976); G. STERNUEB & J. HUGHE&, supra note 
303. 
m E.g., emiuions offsets, see text at notes 334-54, supra and Class III lands, see text at 
notes 318-33, supra. 
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how can the gains won thus far be maintained over any long period 
of time in the face of the growth-imperative? 
F. The Energy Crisis 
The first major legislative revision of the Clean Air Act came in 
1974 in the wake of the so-called "energy crisis" of the previous 
winter.398 Faced with the voracious energy demands of the economy 
and the negative impacts of increasingly expensive oil imports on 
the balance of trade and the international diplomatic strategy of the 
United States, the national leadership in business and government 
has promoted a policy of "national energy independence" under 
both Republican and Democratic administrations. 400 
One of the salient features of the new energy policy is an increased 
reliance on domestic coal, a notoriously dirty fuel. To a lesser extent 
the policy emphasizes the use of high-sulfur Alaskan oil with its 
attendant air pollution hazards. Another thrust of national policy 
has been to force better gas mileage in new cars, but this goal com-
petes with the attainment of emissions standards. Since consumers 
also desire better gasoline mileage because of higher gas prices, the 
automobile industry is in a good position to resist or delay pollution 
control measures. National energy policy thus contradicts the clean 
air effort. 
G. Declining Maintenance of Existing Pollution Sources 
Even in cases where industrial decline or stagnation is not ob-
vious, companies may try to cut costs in ways which produce more, I 
not less, pollution over time}Ol Oil refining is a good example ofthis 
phenomenon}02 Twenty years ago, a refinery would be shut down for 
four weeks a year for maintenance.4°3 Such maintenance is essential 
for the prevention of leaks and accidents which spew pollutants into 
the air. Major maintenance work is performed less often now, 
usually without even closing the refinery. Furthermore, the number 
of workers operating a refinery has fallen by half in the same time 
, .. Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88 
Stat. 246 (1974) . 
• 00 See text at notes 124, 130, supra. 
,., On the tendency to cut labor costs, in particular as profits decline see B. COMMONER, 
supra note 397 . 
••• On the recent cyclic decline in refinery profitability see J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL 
(1976) . 
• 03 Conversation with Anthony Mazzochi, Vice-President, Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers 
International, Berkeley, California, May I, 1978. 
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period, leaving almost no laborers and no time for on-going routine 
maintenance and inspection.404 As a result, the physical condition 
of refineries has deteriorated and, with it, the condition of the sur-
rounding air. 
H. Recession 
The international economic troubles of the 1970's have, contrib-
uted significantly to all the preceding problems, thus acting as a 
major impediment to the achievement of clean air. Economic condi-
tions have contracted markets, cut profits and generated lay-offs in 
almost all United States industries, especially among the oldest and 
weakest of the big industries.4OI Their impact has been harshest on 
declining regions, sapping them of investment and further imperil-
ing the livelihood of the residents.408 The economic crisis has gener-
ated serious fiscal problems for cities, making any revenue-
producing growth, whatever its character, appear more attractive.407 
It has also exacerbated the balance of payments problems of the 
United States, making the outflow of energy-dollars a greater threat 
J to the national economy. 408 Finally, the recession has left less sur-
plus for "indulging" in environmental protection in general, shifting 
priorities to the achievement of a healthy economy.4GB In short, the 
recession has pinched the pocketbooks of industry, labor and gov-
ernment, making everyone hungrier for jobs, growth and tax re-
ceipts. Consequently, many of the social goals of the 1960's, includ-
ing clean air, have been scaled down. In hard times, social welfare 
notions are often the first to be abandoned because they are viewed 
as "unrealistic" or as "luxurious."uo Recession therefore has a pow-
erful effect on the continued struggle for clean air. 
4I4ld. 
till On the recent receuion, see E. MANDBL, THE SBCOND SLUMP (1978); U.S. CAPITALISM IN 
CRISIS (Union of Radical Political Economists, ed. 1978); P. SWEEZY & H. MAGDOFF, THE END 
OF PRoSPERITY (1977); THE ECONOMIC CR1818 RBAoBR (D. Mermelstein ed. 1975) . 
... Heil, Sunbelt Migration. in U.S. CAPITALISM IN CR1818 87 (Union of Radical Political 
Economists, ed. 1978); Mauey & Meagan, supra note 397; Watkins & Perry, supra note 379; 
G. STERNUBB & J. HUGHBS, supra note 303. 
m THE FIsCAL CRISIS OF THB AMBRiCAN CITIBS. supra note 380 . 
... Sweezy & Magdoft', Emerging Currency and Trade Wars, 29 MONTHLY REv. 1 (1978) . 
... England, Environmental Gains Going Up in Smoke. in U.S. CAPITALISM IN CRISIS 152 
(Union of Radical Political Economists, ed. 1978). 
'.0 On the erosion of social welfare gains since the 1960's see R. PARKER, THE MYTH OF THE 
MmDLE CLASS (1972). The cuts made in New York City's budget following the 1974 fiscal crisis 
are a good microcosm of what happens during a period of financial difficulty ~ See Tabb, 
Blaming the Victim, in THE FIsCAL CRISIS OF AMBRiCAN CITIBS 315 (R. Alcaly & D. Mermel-
stein eds. 1977). 
1978] CLEAN AIR ACT 251 
I. Unanticipated Circumstances and Technological Change 
An important principle of the capitalist economy is that internal 
changes cannot be controlled or easily anticipated by government 
regulators. Consequently, barriers to successful realization of the 
goals of the Clean Air Act exist which Congress did not, strictly 
speaking, anticipate when it passed the 1970 legislation. For exam-
ple, Congress did not envision the downswing of the business cycle, 
the decline of the steel industry to its present nadir, the implications 
of shifting investment, the movement of new industry to the sun belt 
or the other inter-sectoral, inter-regional and international move-
ments of capita1.4Il In passing the single-purpose Clean Air Act, it ,./ 
concentrated on a single attribute of post-war economic develop-
ment: deteriorating air quality. But in segmenting one aspect of a 
complex problem, Congress overlooked its structural causes. Conse-
quently, EPA found itself limited to the use of static tools in a 
dynamic situation. 
One type of dynamic change which Congress cannot anticipate ./ 
and regulators cannot control easily is technical change. Examples 
of technical innovations that create new, unanticipated difficulties 
for Clean Air Act enforcement include the continuing output of new 
chemical substances with toxic, carcinogenic and mutagenic proper-
ties,412 and the emerging capability to produce synthetic fuels from 
coal which creates serious by-product emissions.4t3 
New knowledge about pollutants in the air and their health ef- j 
fects has created a second category of unanticipated change. Scien-
tists have recognized dangers from previously unknown sources, for 
example, from substances found in extremely low concentrations 
which could not be measured before. Official cognizance of their 
danger has come, albeit reluctantly.414 However, both knowledge of 
the dangers and government action continually lag behind the pro-
duction of new industrial substances. The short list of toxins and the 
great emphasis on the six "criteria pollutants" of the 1970 Act seem 
ruefully outdated and inadequate from a current perspective. 
Certain results of the Clean Air Act itself have presented regula-
tors with problems. New fuel additives developed to replace lead 
<II A discussion of the causes of these phenomena which originally created the economic 
barriers is beyond the scope of this article. Such arguments, however, can be found in the 
works referenced throughout Section V. 
m B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971). 
113 Sauter, Synthetic Fuel Hazards,THE ELEMENTS 1 (April 1977). 
"' See text at notes 51-52, supra, 
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have themselves proven to be hazardous.us Catalytic converters, 
which have successfully reduced most automobile emissions, pro-
duce increased emissions of sulfuric acid. 416 Powerplants in their 
search for coal and their avoidance of air standards have relocated 
to the Rocky Mountain region where they no longer pollute the 
already substandard air of metropolitan areas, but rather degrade 
previously pristine airsheds. U7 Indeed, it appears that the, only de-
velopment which the enforcers of the Clean Air Act can definitely 
anticipate is unanticipated change. 
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY GOVERNMENT CANNOT REGULATE AND PLAN 
FOR CLEAN AIR 
In the last twenty years, public sentiment against increasing pol-
lution of the environment produced a change in philosophy toward 
..; pollution problems. Abandoning the former laissez-faire attitude, 
environmentalists and other clean air advocates have apparently 
adopted the view that the solution to pollution problems lies in 
government regulation. This article has questioned the ideology of 
regulation, which is so prevalent in American politics. 
The perception of the problem of governing in our society as one 
of mobilizing popular sentiment, passing a law and creating a gov-
ernment agency to enforce the law is a mystification of political-
economic reality. Such a simplistic perception is more prevalent 
than might be supposed.418 Yet, even more sophisticated views still 
mystify the actual processes of social control and social change by 
explaining the phenomenon of regulatory failure - and hence the 
basic difficulty of controlling conditions of society such as air qual-
ity and energy use - as, inter alia, failures in logic by the architects 
of regulatory programs, failures of will on the part of those who were 
to implement and enforce the programs, failures of judicial logic in 
interpretation of the Act and regulations or "capture" of regulatory 
agencies. This article strives to pierce the layers of illusion to reveal 
the real nature of the problem of societal self-governance which 
underlies the failure of regulation. 
... See text at note 203, supra . 
... See text at note 186, supra. 
'" See text at note 304, supra . 
... There seems to be an assumption that regulation acts simply and directly, and that 
the issuance of a rule or an order by an administrative agency results in the achievement 
of the mandate and the purpose of that rule or order without any complic"ating conse-
quences. This assumption is not to be found explicitly in any discussion but seems to be 
implied in most of the literature. 
D. SAVAGE et ai., THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS 168 (1974). 
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Any belief that the original goals of the Clean Air Act would be 
met on schedule has been destroyed by the passage of time. The 
1975 goals may still be reached in the future. Yet, although such 
speculation cannot be proven false before the fact, the relativ~ly 
limited progress made toward cleaner air and the erosion of the law 
which was designed to achieve that goal strongly indicate that 
clean air standards will not be met. Faced with the present reality 
of unmet goals and eroded law, various agents of government and 
the legal system must shoulder the blame. EPA, in particular, is a 
primary target for criticism. However, all agents have weakened at 
one time or another, and EPA often took a strong stand on issues 
only to be overridden by the President, courts or Congress. Thus, 
major change is difficult unless all branches of government move 
simultaneously.m 
"Government" is not the source of the problem, however. Govern- j 
ment actors are typically moved by external political forces, and 
government policies encounter barriers to their realization in the 
external economic environment. The economic structure and its 
imperatives are the origin of the once-removed, but politically pow-
erful, obstacles to successful implementation of the Clean Air Act 
and the source of erosion of the Act. Government cannot overcome 
these barriers and simply regulate and plan for clean air because it 
does not have sufficient power. The regulators do not control the v 
central variables which determine the amount and kind of pollu-
tants which are put into the air. They do not control the key deci-
sions over production, investment, employment and location. They 
can only try to redirect the decisions of those who do have these 
basic economic powers. Moreover, government lacks control over 
the collective result of private economic activities. Congress and 
EP A do not have the wherewithal to prevent an industrial crisis in 
steel or automobile manufacturing nor to countermand the interna-
tional recession and inflation of the 1970's. Their role is limited to 
a "realistic" reaction to such exigencies. The indirect power of the 
economic system disciplines the regulators and their supporters by 
means of crisis. It forces them to retreat from strict enforcement of 
pollution laws for fear of creating unemployment, triggering regional 
economic decline or disrupting the economy severely by penalizing 
a major industry. Similarly, regulators cannot redirect the path of 
economic development, whether this means reorganizing the spatial 
layout of cities, revising a wasteful pattern of intensive energy use 
'" See P. BACHRACH & M. BARATz, supra note 363. 
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or reorienting the country's transportation system. Such enterprises 
would require not only that command over economic decisions 
which government does not have, but also would require time to 
rebuild the physical environment of human activity and effect com-
plex social change, which no single piece of legislation can achieve. 
" Clean air regulations are thus limited by the parameters of gov-
ernment power. They are also limited by the positive eX,ercise of 
; power by the class in society which has the most to lose from suc-
cessful societal control over production and investment deci-
sions-the owners and managers of capital. Such power expresses 
itself directly and indirectly. Business can resist regulation and lim-
its on its freedom to make a profit when and how it chooses through 
the direct use of economic power. This resistance takes such forms 
as lawsuits, noncompliance or relocation to avoid areas with strict 
regulation; it may be transformed into political power such as 
lobbying or support from voters who would be hurt by relocation. 
The cumulative decisions of private capital are also fundamental in 
shaping the patterns of urbanization, transportation and energy-use 
that exist today and confront government regulators as givens. 42o 
This shaping power of capital extends into the future as well; as 
capital changes societal patterns, regulators appear only to be chas-
ing after it-coping with new hazardous products, new locations for 
powerplants and new industrial processes. Finally, however, private 
power is also confined within a certain range prescribed by the 
exigencies of social reproduction as a whole and by the cumulative 
impact of a multitude of individual decisions made by the purveyors 
of capital. U.S. Steel and General Motors, despite their size, are as 
powerless as EPA to prevent recession or regional chAnge. 
J The division and inequality of power and the role of economic 
imperatives do not reduce the reality of the political economy to 
either total domination by economic imperatives or economic deter-
minism. Regulation can effect change; it already has produced 
cleaner air. Without the Clean Air Act of 1970, air quality probably 
would not have shown any improvement, and worse conditions 
might now prevail. The evidence presented in this article chronicles 
the erosion of the Act, but it also shows how the political activities 
of clean air advocates have played an important role in influencing 
the actions of regulators and attaining the gains that have so far 
been made. 
To a large degree, then, the perception of government as regulator 
•• See Walker & Large, supra note 227. 
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is a,lso a myth; instead, the government is an arena where contend-
ing '(orces do battle over the conditions of social life, such as the 
(._-... '. \ ~ual)ty. of air, and society str~ggles to discover the possibilities for 
j )Im,Provmg the way we work, hve, govern ourselves-and breathe. If 
'\,Ly!ean. air is .found nO.t to. be achievable given. p~esently existing bar-
\\ ners m socIal orgamzatIOn, then, perhaps, It IS not new laws that 
1\ are needed but a transformed economic and political system as a 
\vho1~ 
POSTSCRIPT 
Between the time this article was completed (mid-1978) and the 
final preparations for its publication were made (early-1979), a few 
noteworthy events occurred which further corroborate the article's 
theme of "erosion" of the Clean Air Act. 
*For the first time, a primary ambient air quality standard has 
been relaxed. On January 26, 1979, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) Administrator Douglas Costle lowered the ozone 
standard from 0.08 parts per million to 0.12 parts per million, a fifty 
percent increase.· Although EPA claimed that its action could be 
justified by new health research findings, 2 this claim was vigorously 
disputed by environmentalists and by the California Air Resources 
Board.3 The American Petroleum Institute, on the other hand, said 
that it would file suit to lower the standard still further. 4 
* According to the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, new State 
Implementation Plans must be forthcoming by January 1, 1979 for 
areas still not in compliance with air quality standards.5 As of the 
January 1, 1979 deadline, however, not one state had submitted its 
plan to EPA.6 
*Opponents of the Clean Air Act won an important strategic vic-
tory in California with respect to the preparation of the revised 
I 44 Fed. Reg. 8202 (1979) (amending 40 C.F.R. § 50.9). The revision also changed the 
chemical designation of the standards from "photochemical oxidants" to "ozone," the princi-
pal, but far from sole, component of photochemical smog. [d. Only two cities out of 105 being 
monitored currently meet the standard; EPA estimates that 15-20 smaller cities will meet 
the new standard. Most large cities are considerably above both standards; Los Angeles is 
the worst. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1979, at 1, col. 2. 
2 See 44 Fed. Reg. 8203-04, 8207-11 (1979). 
3 San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 27, 1979, at 1, col. 2. 
• [d. 
, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 172, 91 Stat. 746 (1977) (to be 
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 7502). 
, Personal communications with an anonymous EPA official, San Francisco Regional Off-
ice, March 3, 1979. 
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State Plan. Owing to its history of leadership in air quality control, 
California is widely considered to be a test case for how vigorously 
other states will respond to the new deadline. Therefore, any weak-
ening of that state's resolve redounds to the detriment of EPA's 
willingness to pressure less aggressive states. 
The first step in the California-based opposition effort to under-
mine state planning was to attack local efforts to prepare regional 
air quality plans which would ultimately be incorporated in the 
State Plan. The San Francisco Bay Area Environmental Manage-
ment Plan, drafted by a task force under the auspices of the Associa-
tion of Bay Area Governments, is the most important of these air 
quality plans. The Bay Area Environmental Management Plan was 
stimulated by and funded under Section 208 of the 1972 Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act,7 and originally consisted of two units: 
air and water. Under fire from business-led organizations such as 
the California Council for Economic and Environmental Balance, 
the Committee on Labor and Business and the Bay Area Council,8 
the task force ultimately dropped proposed land use controls 
thereby weakening the air pollution control plan.9 This remained an 
equivocal victory for the organizations, however, because the State 
Air Resources Board, under Tom Quinn, still had final say over the 
State Plan. However, opponents of the Board went to the California 
legislature with a bill which said that the Air Resources Board could 
not revise the air management plan, but must include it as is in the 
final State Plan. to Governor Brown signed the bill into law in Sep-
tember, 1978, over the objections of his own close advisor, Quinn. 11 
*Emboldened by the preceding success, the Clean Air Act opposi-
tion introduced bills in both houses of the California legislature 
which would force the Air Resources Board to submit the final State 
Implementation Plan to the legislature for approval before it could 
be forwarded to EPA. t2 
*On January 23, 1979, the California Energy Commission and the 
State Air Resources Board adopted a joint policy aimed at stream-
1 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1976). 
• See, e.g., [SAN FRANCISCO] BAY AREA COUNCIL, BAY AREA COUNCIL BULLETIN (No. 17, Feb. 
1979) for these business-led organizations' attitude toward pollution control. 
• Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) Environmental Management Plan for the 
San Francisco Bay Region, final version approved by ABAG on Jan. 13, 1979. 
,. SB 2167 (1978). 
" Personal communications with an anonymous member of the Air Resources Board Staff, 
Sacramento, California, Sept. 21, 1978. See also BAY AREA COUNCIL BULLETIN 6 (No. 17, Feb. 
1979). 
12 SB 228 and AB 300 (1979). 
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lining government permit procedures for powerplants. The policy 
gives final authority to the Energy Commission and allows the Com-
mission to override local air pollution control districts if necessary. 13 
This move was sharply attacked by local district authorities in 
Southern California and by environmentalists. 14 A spokesman for 
Friends of the Earth objected to the policy on the grounds that 
"[i]t comes down to power plants not having to meet state stan-
dards when all other industries dO."15 
*Finally, a national congress of business and labor groups was 
held in San Francisco in January, 1979, to consider methods for 
compelling Congress to amend the Clean Air Act and to eliminate 
its most objectionable features. This bold offensive against the Act 
was sponsored by such organizations as the American Petroleum 
Institute, the Bay Area Council, the Commission on Labor and 
Business, the Construction Industry Advancement Fund and the 
California Council for Economic and Environmental Balance, with 
the latter serving as host. 18 Clearly, the success of cam paigns against 
environmental regulations in California directed by well-funded 
united-front organizations, like the Council for Economic and Envi-
ronmental Balance, has moved the business-led forces of opposition 
to a new level of coordinated activity in place of the more or less 
random acts oflegal obstruction and non-compliance characteristic 
of their past struggle against the Clean Air Act. 17 
,3 San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 24, 1979, at 1, col. 1. 
" [d. 
" Ron Rudolph, quoted in Not Man Apart, Feb. 1979, at 6, col. 1. 
" An idea of the antagonistic tone of the Conference (for which there are no transcripts) 
can be had from the excerpts of speeches printed in the BAY AREA COUNCIL BULLETIN 2-4 (No. 
17, Feb. 1979), 
17 For more on the crucial anti-regulatory initiatives of business and labor in California 
see Walker, Storper & Gersh, The Limits of Environmental Control: The SaRa of Bow in 
the Delta, to be published in 11 ANTIPODE (1979). 
